The Japanese attached much importance to local reconnaissance, whereas the Russian leaders considered it as something unusual, so that Kuropatkin was finally obliged to prescribe it in army orders. "Local reconnaissance was performed by 20 to 30 infantrymen. These carefully approached our positions in small groups. One man of each group laid his rifle aside and crawled close up to our trenches, raised his head and observed, while three or four of his companions, whom he had left farther in rear, opened fire on the trenches. Occasionally all of these men threw themselves flat on the ground for protection. This mode of procedure continued for seven hours."
The thoroughness of the reconnaissance generally made a timely deployment possible, even when the enemy was well concealed, but that neglects occurred nevertheless is borne out by the advance of the Japanese 2nd Division at Fuchau and Kapukai on March 10th, 1905. This division advanced without reconnoitering, struck the fortified Russian position, was unable to move forward or to the rear, and had to fight under unfavorable conditions, and while suffering heavy losses, from early morning until 4 P. M., when the general situation compelled the enemy to evacuate the position. The advance of the Russian 54th Division (Orlof) during the battle of Liao Yang (2nd Sept.) is a similar example of disproportionately greater importance and with a tragic ending. The noise of the battle at Sykwantun caused the commander of the 54th Division to leave the position assigned him on the heights of the Yentai mines and to march toward the sound of the cannonading. The division, advancing over covered terrain without adequate reconnaissance, was taken in flank and rear by the Japanese 12th Brigade (Sasaki),[1] and thrown back in utter rout upon its former position, carrying with it the troops which had been left there. Thus the Yentai heights fell into the possession of the Japanese.
The primary object of local reconnaissance is to protect
a force from surprise. This may be accomplished by sending
out combat patrols, and by company commanders riding ahead
in time. (Par. 457 German I. D. R.). The latter are likewise
charged with picking out avenues of approach to selected fire
positions, and the sooner they begin the reconnaissance the
better, for the accidents of the ground can then be utilized to
the best advantage.
The difficulties of the reconnaissance are increased when
- ↑ For details of the attack made by Sasaki's Brigade, see Gertsch, Vom russisch-japanischen Kriege, I, sketch 14.
