has made preparations for defense; and where the hostile artillery is posted. As a rule, it will be impossible, until after the engagement has begun, to recognize a skillfully located fortified position,[1] to distinguish between the real and dummy trenches, determine the position of obstacles and estimate whether they can be surmounted with or without adequate apparatus. Then it likewise becomes necessary to find and mark covered avenues of approach.[2] In moving to new firing positions, it is important that advanced positions, masks, and dummy trenches be recognized in time. The commander of a unit on a flank should make dispositions for observation on his flank, and for permanent communication with neighboring units, even though no specific orders have been received by him to that effect. Strange as it may seem, the troops deployed on the road Gorze—Rezonville (battle of Vionville), by their failure to get into early communication with the troops which had been on the ground for some time, neglected to take advantage of the information gained by those troops.[3]
The enumeration of these tasks shows that local reconnaissance should not be restricted to the preparatory stage of the combat alone, but that it must be kept up during the whole course of the action. To the duties enumerated, we may add, occasional tasks, such as picking off staffs and signal men; sneaking up on artillery that has been incautiously pushed forward; and annoying the enemy by flanking fire. For such tasks, so-called "scouting detachments,"[4] after the Russian pat-*
- ↑ See Taktik, V, p. 243, et seq.
- ↑ Hoppenstedt (Schlacht der Zukunft, pp. 134 and 140) draws a graphic picture which is a faithful reproduction of reality. The procedure outlined by that author (Ibid., p. 122) for indicating, by means of flag signals, points sheltered from hostile fire, seems practicable. He states: "Holding his flag upright, the member of the patrol proceeds steadily on his way to Weyer. Now he has arrived at the point where the road bends slightly toward the south; his flag descends," etc.
- ↑ Kunz, Kriegsgeschichtliche Beispiele, 8-9, p. 128, et seq., p. 243. The necessity for thorough reconnaissance is illustrated by the successful "fire surprises" carried out by the Boers at Modder River on November 28th, 1899, and at Colenso, against Hart's Brigade advancing in dense masses, on December 15th, 1899.
- ↑ v. Tettau, Die Jagdkommandos der russischen Armee, Berlin, 1901. Hoppenstedt, Patrouillen und Radfahrkommandos, 1907.
