more imminent since no importance is attached to a more definite limitation of the frontage to be covered, while wide extension is, on the contrary, actually preached. The fear of losses will gain the upper hand and the attack will lose its energy. "It is easy to teach troops to be over-cautious, but it is a precarious undertaking to lead such troops against the enemy." (Sir Ian Hamilton).
Whither such an endeavor to utilize cover must lead, is shown by the
advance of the 35th Füsilier Regiment past Vionville on Flavigny and the group of trees north of that village. The violent fire directed upon these companies caused them to deviate to right and left, to leave their battalions, and to lose the march direction designated by the regimental commander.[1] One company of the IInd Battalion 35th Füsilier Regiment, which formed the center (march direction, a point north of Flavigny), participated in the assault made on Flavigny by the IIIrd Battalion; the other companies moved to the left against Vionville and were joined by a company of the IIIrd Battalion.—"A peculiar feature of this fight was the fire directed from the group of trees on the attacking force which advanced against the center of the hostile position. Ten of the twelve companies of the attacking force (3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th and 11th of the 35th Füsilier Regiment, and 9th, 10th and 12th of the 20th Infantry) were scattered to right and left by this fire, and forced to move in a totally different direction than was originally intended. The direction was maintained to a certain extent only by two companies (the 3rd and 11th of the 20th Infantry)."[2] While the new German Infantry Drill Regulations do not underestimate the difficulties of an advance over open ground, they require that the march direction be maintained and that cover to be utilized only within the assigned "combat section"; they leave it to subordinate commanders to choose suitable expedients for crossing such unfavorable ground. "Within the limits of the section assigned to an organization for an attack, the plain devoid of cover should be avoided as far as possible, or weak, widely extended detachments only should be ordered to advance over it, while the bulk of the force is launched at a point where an approach under cover is practicable. If suitable
