Page:Tactics (Balck 1915).djvu/322

From Wikisource
Jump to navigation Jump to search
This page needs to be proofread.

when fire alone suffices for delaying the enemy (for example, in rear guard actions). In this case the guns may either be pushed far to the front, or may be used in defensive positions, which can then be held by a few men during the pauses in the fight.[1] Although machine gun fire may perhaps be relatively less accurate than that of a body of infantry, the value of pouring a large mass of projectiles on the enemy within a brief space of time should not be underestimated.[2]

Whether machine guns are distributed by platoons, or are employed as a unit under control of superior leaders, will depend upon whether it is contemplated to employ them in a purely defensive way for the purpose of reinforcing the several weak points, or offensively in fire surprises or in covering the flanks. The distribution by platoons has the undeniable disadvantage that single guns will frequently not find an opportunity to fire; that the difficulty of ammunition supply is increased; and that the combined employment of the several platoons will produce friction that cannot be easily avoided. On the other hand, in machine gun batteries of three platoons each, an employment by platoons is easy. Although a distribution by platoons is permissible in a passive defense, the employment of the guns by battery (company) against the flanks of the attacker permits the mobility and fire power of the arm to be utilized to better advantage. While a distribution of machine guns by platoons—if we except colonial and mountain warfare—is, indeed, cheaper, it generally leads to a useless frittering away of fighting units.[3]

  1. At the Austrian Musketry School it was found that it was not easy for a body of troops to fire on targets illuminated by the shaft of a search light; few men possessed the requisite eyesight to make this possible. It would no doubt be practicable, however, to attach such men to the machine guns posted in a defensive position. A considerable increase in fire effect could thus be obtained.
  2. Platoon volleys, directed for one minute on figures advancing from 1200-1100 paces, resulted in 5, fire at will, in 1-1/2, and machine gun fire, in 3% hits. The three kinds of fire, when directed against 30 prone skirmishers, resulted, in one minute, in 13, 18, and 10% hits, respectively.
  3. Lieutenant Ulrich (retired), who participated in the fighting in Manchuria, voices the same opinion in Jahrbücher, March number, p. 285: "The opinion has been quite prevalent that the organization of strong machine gun units is one of the most important requirements of modern battle."