Infantry advanced on the left flank. The Koslov Regiment, advancing without hesitation in quick time and at attention, was fired on by three Japanese batteries while it was moving from 4000 to 2000 m. The regiment lost about 600 men. This loss is insignificant when the size of the target (about 600 m. wide and 1000 m. deep) is considered. The Japanese did not care to become involved in a serious infantry action and therefore evacuated the place. It would have been better to advance by rushes with smaller units, as the terrain afforded no cover whatever. Whenever the Japanese had sufficient time, they crossed such plains singly, one by one, and then assembled under cover for the attack.
3. FIRING ON ARTILLERY IN POSITION
was in the past a pet fire problem. The effect of frontal fire on artillery whose guns are protected by shields is so small that the expenditure of ammunition is not justifiable.[1] The gap between the steel shields of the French field gun is not large enough to exert a noticeable influence. Steel shields, 3 mm. thick, afford protection against steel jacketed bullets fired at or beyond 300 m.; against "S" and "D" projectiles they afford protection, it is said, beyond 500 m. only. Machine guns directing continuous fire on a point may obtain better results. According to firing tests 3 mm. armor plate can be pierced up to 1000 m. only by special projectiles (solid steel projectiles and those having a steel core), the adoption of which is precluded on practical grounds (variations in sectional density, and difficulty of manufacture).[2] For this reason, it is better to leave the task of destroying shielded batteries, even when they are in the open, to one's own artillery, than to at-*
- ↑ Even prior to the adoption of shields it was demonstrated that infantry was unable to destroy the matériel of batteries so as to render them immobile; it could only interfere with the personnel, but could not demolish the batteries.
- ↑ Mitteilungen über Gegenstände des Artillerie und Geniewesens, 1907, No. 5.
