able to come up. It was impossible for these batteries to limber up under the hostile fire. It was likewise impossible to destroy a battery, though without protecting shields, even when great quantities of ammunition were expended.
At the battle of Beaumont, the artillery of the 7th Infantry Division suffered heavy losses. "Although the first caisson sections were up and the men with them were detailed to assist in working the guns, the gun squads in both batteries had dwindled down to 2 or 3 men each by 1 P. M., i. e., within half an hour." Immediately after the French attack had been repulsed, one of these batteries was able to accompany the advancing infantry, however, while the other (the 4th Light Battery) could not move its guns until an hour later, as it had lost 29 men and 34 horses.[1] This example proves again that when artillery has once managed to go into position and to open fire, it cannot be annihilated by infantry alone, and therefore need not fear to take up a more than temporary position in the first line.
The best way for artillery to protect itself against annoyance from hostile infantry fire is to push forward an infantry screen, even if only a weak one. In the days when batteries had no shields, this screen enabled artillery to devote its entire attention to the principal target without regard to hostile infantry. At the present time, especially in positions in rear of a crest and in long artillery lines, the principal object of such a screen is to prevent hostile patrols from molesting the artillery. Small detachments posted at wide intervals are sufficient for this purpose. The flanks and rear are now as in the past the vulnerable points and are most exposed to daring, sudden attacks, even if only made by weak hostile detachments. (Par. 448 German I. D. R.).
At the battle of Vionville,[2] about 5 P. M., four horse and seven field
batteries of the IIIrd Army Corps were engaged near Flavigny with ten
