from Flanville against Montoy. On the French side, the 62nd Infantry was likewise advancing against Flanville and had arrived at Montoy when the 44th Infantry (Prussian) very unexpectedly appeared on its left flank. The French regimental commander decided to attack at once. "The Prussian detachments advancing south of Montoy were about to scale the west slope of the ravine near there, when, at very short range, they suddenly encountered the rapid fire of a dense French skirmish line, which was immediately followed by the counter-attack, consisting of columns in close order. At the same moment, the left flank of the Prussians was attacked from the south, and other hostile columns advanced from the park through the west entrance of the village. The Prussian skirmish lines were repulsed in an instant, and thrown into complete confusion. The hostile fire had an annihilating effect on account of the short range, and the situation was at once completely reversed. The Prussians sought in vain to gain a firm foothold in the eastern outskirts of the village of Montoy. Their losses were heavy. The four companies (3rd, 9th, 11th and 12th) of the 44th Infantry numbered in all 18 officers and 840 men; they lost 7 officers and 480 men, of which number 1 officer and 82 men (all unharmed) were taken prisoners. The 9th Company suffered least; but the 3rd, 11th and 12th Companies (44th Infantry) lost in all 55.5% of their effective strength, the 3rd Company even losing 67%."[1]
This surprise could without doubt have been avoided. If the 44th Infantry had sent mounted men ahead, it would have been in a position to let the French walk into its fire. Soon after this occurrence, the French infantry also unexpectedly received flanking fire from Flanville, which forced it to abandon the pursuit after suffering some losses.
When two forces unexpectedly collide in close country,
the advantage rests decidedly with the one that opens fire and
advances to the charge first. This onslaught with cold steel
should become second nature to the troops. In traversing close
country, a force should be in a formation that enables it to
develop an adequate fire and to make a charge in compact formation.
A line formation is entirely unsuitable, as a rule, on
account of the difficulties of the terrain to be overcome, and in
a skirmish line the officers cannot properly control the men.
For passing through thinly scattered timber without underbrush,[2] company column is a suitable formation, and for dense woods platoons advancing either abreast or echeloned, each platoon in line of squads in columns of files. If the platoons
