be made. If we do not take advantage of the fleeting moment the enemy will surely do so, and, as a rule, he will not be any better prepared for action than we are. Frequently the deployment from route column is not made because the commander desires it, but because it is necessary in order to avert a crisis in the leading line. The commander who is acting under hostile pressure should endeavor to regain the upper hand as quickly as possible so that he can dispose of the troops of the main body with a definite object in view. In a rencontre, the advantage rests almost invariably with the commander who quickly sizes up the situation, attacks promptly, and succeeds in throwing the opponent on the defensive. A bold, impetuous attack, which would lead to disaster in the presence of an opponent already deployed, may, in this case, be productive of victory. The direction in which the attack is made is of less importance than a prompt decision on the part of the commander and the simultaneous launching of the whole force in a definite direction. We must take the terrain as we find it. In covered terrain, the effect of the surprise will be increased still more, while in open country, the preparatory stage of the combat will soon lose that character, because the side which has an advantage as regards terrain will make use of it, and the conviction will force itself upon the opponent that victory cannot be gained by an impetuous attack alone. It will be easy for a commander to come to a decision as to the action to be taken if he is conscious of his own strength or fears that the enemy desires to avoid an attack. (The commanders of the advanced troops of the IIIrd Army Corps at Vionville). The rencontre increases the difficulties of troop leading, but makes the attack easier for the troops.
The difference between a deliberately planned attack and a rencontre is most clearly apparent in the conduct of the advance guard. Its task is to secure the prospective artillery
