Page:Tactics (Balck 1915).djvu/364

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hostile force deployed on a front of 400-600 m., this does not necessarily mean that the entire division must systematically concentrate for action, as this would cause a considerable loss of time, thus giving the enemy a great advantage. The general situation and the mission of a force are of greater importance for the commander's decision, than the state of readiness for action of the opposing forces.

Issue of orders. See Taktik, V, p. 197.

The advance guard must be promptly informed of the intentions of the commander (i.e., whether he intends to attack, to concentrate for attack farther to the rear, or to let the enemy attack[1]) and of the location of the prospective artillery position. The attack order should be withheld until the combat of the advance guard has sufficiently cleared the situation, but a development of the force should be ordered at once.

The advanced detachments should endeavor to gain a start in deployment over the enemy and cover the advancing artillery in front and flank, by quickly deploying strong firing lines and pushing machine guns to the front. After they have done this, they should promptly advance to the attack. Through this, our firing line, while in the act of deploying, runs the serious risk of suddenly encountering, at short range, the fire of superior hostile troops, at a time when all the troops approaching the field are still too far distant to increase its fire power[2] Whether the quickly formed firing lines should at once move forward to the attack in a rencontre, depends upon the impressions received by the commander. His dispositions should be such as to compel the enemy to disclose his available forces at an early moment. Every fighting line is so sensitive to fire simultaneously delivered against its front and flank, that an attempt to turn the hostile position will instantly force the enemy to take counter-measures. If the enemy is unable to keep pace with us in deploying a firing line, if he is unable to deploy skirmish lines as dense as ours, this state of affairs

  1. Par. 350 German I. D. R.
  2. This induces the British Infantry Training to prescribe that in a rencontre a concentration for attack should invariably be ordered.