shortening of route columns, due regard being had to protection of the front and flanks—to permit a deployment of the force at the right moment and in a suitable formation toward the hostile side.[1] Within effective range of the enemy, such a movement by the flank can be carried out only when cover is available, otherwise the hostile fire will very quickly force the troops making the flank march to face to the front.[2]
The attempt of the 16th Infantry Division to envelop the French position
on the Hallue[3]: The 30th Brigade used the road leading along the
hostile front from Querrieux to Frechencourt, for its movement. The
leading regiment of the brigade, the 28th Infantry, on debouching from
Querrieux, immediately faced toward the annoying flanking fire and endeavored
to advance in the face of it, while the brigade commander, energetically
carrying out the orders given him, led the 68th Infantry toward
Frechencourt, thus forestalling several French battalions that were hurrying
up from the east. The village was occupied and held by the 68th Infantry,
but a frontal offensive movement against the hostile main position
could not be carried out from here either, in spite of the inferiority of
the French troops.
Whether an enveloping force can be sent into action at
once without being first placed in a preparatory position[4]
or whether it should first be concentrated, depends upon the
situation of the troops engaged in front with the enemy (the
necessity of relieving the pressure on the Ist Army engaged in
front with the enemy at Königgrätz), and upon the countermeasures
taken by the enemy. If the assailant encounters a
- ↑ v. Schlichting. Taktische und strategische Grundsätze, I, p. 90, et seq. The attack of the six Brandenburg battalions against the Hill of Forbach (Spicheren) is especially instructive in this connection. The attacking force was threatened by hostile troops lodged in the Stiring Wald. The first deployment caused the attacking force to face toward the front of the French position. As soon as this was noticed, the skirmishers were withdrawn in order to be pushed into the fight again at another place. Gernier, Einmarschkämpfe, p. 184.
- ↑ Look up the conduct of the 22nd Infantry Division at Villermain-Cravant, on December 8th, 1870. It is indeed true that a violent snow storm and thick weather made it possible for this force to disengage itself from the enemy and to join the 1st Bavarian Army Corps at Cravant.
- ↑ v. Malachowski, Frontalschlacht und Flügelschlacht, p. 24, et seq. Kunz, Nordarmee, I, p. 134, et seq. In regard to the conduct of the 15th Infantry Division, which was to hold the enemy in front and which advanced prematurely before the enveloping movement of the 16th Division had become effective, consult p. 282 supra, and Taktik, V. p. 163.
- ↑ According to the opinion of General v. Schlichting, a preparatory position should be taken up. Taktische und strategische Grundsätze, III, pp. 133 and 154, et seq. See Taktik, V, p. 174.
