as entire units, but, on the contrary, they are broken up, and, under certain circumstances, even disintegrated into smaller units. The units following in rear remain as long as possible in close order formations, preferably in route columns. "Man is by nature exceedingly timid. Soldiers, even those drawn from the educated classes, who were fully aware of the supreme importance of gaining the victory, broke down on coming under fire. In close order the moral encouragement due to the proximity of superiors and comrades kept up their courage." (Hessert).[1] Where cover is lacking, the supports will also have to be deployed. Large units are broken up into platoons, which deploy and follow each other at considerable distances.[2]
As soon as the enemy opens fire, platoon commanders must decide whether or not it ought to be returned; but the closer one can get to the enemy without firing a shot, the better. According to the German F. S. R. (par. 296), a prolonged, uninterrupted forward movement of skirmish lines in the open, at less than 1000 m. from the enemy, is possible only when supported by adequate fire. On the other hand, even skirmishers lying down suffer serious losses when 600 m. from the enemy.
Thus, at mid ranges, begins the actual, protracted fire fight, which, in the first place, is to make a further advance possible, and which, subsequently, is to produce a superiority of fire. As taught by experience, this cannot be accomplished from a single position, if the enemy is efficient.
A so-called "main firing position", which was to be located 400-600
m. from the enemy, was frequently used during peace maneuvers for the
purpose of bringing cohesion and harmony into the attack. In making
use of such a position, the principal difficulty of every serious infantry
attack, that of crossing the space lying between the first firing position
and the assaulting position, was not appreciated.
- ↑ "We are prone to place the individual on too high a pedestal, and, in doing so, to ignore the psychological element of combat." Major-General Stieler.
- ↑ The losses sustained during the advance of the Russian reserves at Plevna (11th September, 1877), and during the attack made by the Guard on Gorni Dubniac, led to a spontaneous deployment on the part of the reserves.
