information he has in regard to the situation. During an attack the reserve is frequently not designated until a preparatory position is taken up. In attack about 1/4-1/3, and in defense 1/6-1/2 of the whole force is put in the reserve, depending upon whether the ensuing action is to be a purely defensive one or the decision is sought.
The reserve enables the commander to "shift the center of gravity of the fight to the point desired by him, to reinforce his line where he considers proper, to equalize fluctuations of the combat, and, finally, to bring about the decision." (Par. 294 German I. D. R.). As the combat progresses, the commander must decide whether the situation is such as to compel him to employ the reserves to cover his retreat,[1] or whether it is proper for him to put in his last troops for the purpose of gaining the victory. If the reserve has been put in and the attack fails (or, as at Wörth, the defender succumbs after putting in all the reserves) defeat is certain; but it would be a mistake not to employ the reserve, to keep it in readiness to cover a possible retreat, if its intervention can yet bring about a favorable termination of the combat.
The employment of the reserves by the Russians at Plevna, on
September 11th, 1877: The general reserve consisted of nine battalions
and was too weak to make an impression at one point; fifteen battalions
were detailed to cover the lines of communication and the artillery (which
was not at all in danger). Forty battalions that did not enter the fight
were scattered all over the battlefield, no one being able to account for
their presence.[2] When Skobeleff had effected a lodgment in the Turkish
position, every available man should have been sent to this point. Although
there were 9 battalions, 30 guns, and 4 troops (Eskadrons) available,
only the Schuja Regiment (1300 men), which had suffered heavy losses in
previous actions, was despatched to the point in question, and that more
for the purpose of covering the retreat than to make the most of the
success that had been gained.
In contrast to the Japanese commanders, who promptly launched all their troops, the Russian commanders were inclined to despatch numerous detachments, to organize provisional units, while completely ignoring ex-*
