logical impressions produced by crowding human beings into a narrow space.[1]
A brigade, therefore, should not deploy on a front of 1500 m., i. e., put only about 1/4 of its men in the first line; but no objection can be made if the brigade, in moving to the final decisive assault, at once advances on a front of 2500-3000 m.
13. THE CONDUCT OF THE LEADERS IN ACTION.
The difficulties of troop leading increase as the power of the commander to control and direct all ranks in action by words of command diminishes. In action, therefore, those means must be adopted that will facilitate the transmission of orders. This requires first of all the choice of an appropriate position for the leader.
The beginning of an action should find the leader as far forward as possible; during the advance to the battlefield, with the advance guard (par. 277 German I. D. R.), for neither messages nor reports, nor a map can adequately take the place of personal inspection of the situation of the enemy, of neighboring units, and of the ground. So placed, he can best direct the first deployment, upon which the future course of the action so largely depends, secure advantages by making prompt decisions in face of the enemy, save his own troops from making detours, handle them in accordance with a definite plan, and preclude arbitrary action on the part of the commander of the leading unit.
During the action, the superior commander can influence the course of the fight, his personal example excepted, only by employing his reserves. His place is, therefore, near the
- ↑ The successful attacks made by masses of fanatical warriors in colonial wars are carried out under such peculiar conditions that, for our purposes, deductions therefrom are not admissible. The defeat of the two French brigades at Bang-Bo (24th March, 1885), and at Ki-lua (28th March, 1885). Lehaucourt, Les Expéditions de Tonkins. The defeat of the Italians at Adua (1st March. 1896).
