Page:Tactics (Balck 1915).djvu/441

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The corps evacuated its strong position without a fight when its line of retreat was endangered by Mistshenko's being forced back. The Russians likewise evacuated their main position at Haicheng when news was received that strong hostile forces were advancing against the left flank of the position."[1]


As a rule, it is not advisable to occupy advanced positions,[2] i. e., positions lying within effective range of the main position. Supporting points immediately in front of the main position, projecting from it like caponiers, and flanking the ground over which the assailant will have to make his attack, must not be confounded with these advanced positions. St. Hubert and St. Marie aux Chênes, on the battlefield of Gravelotte are good examples of both classes of positions. In order to gain time, a commander may sometimes find it advantageous to occupy and temporarily defend advanced positions lying still farther to the front. (Lisaine, and Shaho). In doing this, favorable terrain (Chavannes on the Lisaine) and skillful leadership are essential.


In France and Russia much is expected of advanced positions. In England particular importance is attached to them when they draw the enemy in a direction facilitating the conduct of a counter-attack. The British consider that supporting points lying in front of the position had best be left unoccupied, unless they can be supported by artillery fire from the main position.

"Smokeless powder and the great range of modern firearms will frequently make reconnaissance so difficult that it will be possible to gain an approximate idea of the enemy's strength only by a fight. For this reason, in situations similar to that existing west of Belfort, in January 1871, advanced detachments, whose mission it is to deceive the enemy as to the defender's strength, and to compel him to deploy, will have a greater justification now than at that time. Nowadays, such detachments may cover a considerable front without danger, especially when they are plentifully supplied with ammunition. This will make it

  1. See Kriegsgeschichtliche Einzelschriften, 41/42, p. 49.
  2. Taktik, V, p. 270, et seq. No objection can be made to the contemplated construction of advanced positions in front of the Shaho position, as the Russians desired to gain time for the offensive movement to be made by their left wing. The uncertainty and hesitation produced by the constant changes in orders, and the excessive reinforcement of the advanced detachments, which allowed themselves to be led into making a stubborn defense, was fatal.