made by the general reserve is to produce any effect, it must not be undertaken with too small a force, as it could then be checked by weak detachments.
While the general reserve lies in waiting for the enemy, it may either—
1. Remain in a preparatory position, in one or more groups, and deploy during its forward movement; or
2. Take up the attack formation from the start.
The first method has the advantage, when the space required is small, of permitting the general reserve to be concealed, and allows changes to be made in the direction of march and in the dispositions.
The second, although it enables the reserve to advance promptly to the counter-attack, is rarely suitable, as the reserve in combat formation is not so easily concealed, as it is more difficult to make changes in the dispositions and the direction of march, and as this formation seems only practicable for making an advance in one direction—straight to the front.
It is of the utmost importance to know when the counter-attack should be launched. In warding off the enemy by purely frontal action, no special disadvantages result from prematurely launching the general reserve; if it enters the action too late, it will still be able to throw back the assailant who has penetrated into the position. With the counter-attack it is different; it must take place when the opponent is under the most effective fire at short range. If the counter-attack is made prematurely, especially when the reserves and flank echelons of the attacker have not as yet been used up, the latter, while, indeed, exposed to the most violent fire of the defender, will be able to take counter-measures. In that case, two entirely independent actions may result, and the counter-attack made by the general reserve may be checked by the retained echelons of the attacker and repulsed by their fire. When launched prematurely, the counter-attack will not always repulse the hostile attack; and when launched too late, it may perhaps
