I. ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT.
1. THE IMPORTANCE AND EMPLOYMENT OF
INFANTRY.
In all modern armies infantry is, in virtue of its numbers and importance, the principal arm. Since the introduction of firearms, infantry has gradually increased in importance and numbers as compared with the other arms.
In the Thirty Years' war, the proportion of cavalry to infantry was as
1:1, or 1:2, and frequently the cavalry even predominated. In the Swedish
army one gun per 1,000 men was considered sufficient. During the era
of linear tactics in the 18th Century the proportion between the two
principal arms had become as 1:2 and 1:3; in the Napoleonic wars as
1:6 and 1:8. The number of guns was increased to 4 per 1,000 men. In
the course of a campaign the ratio changes to the disadvantage of infantry.
At the outbreak of the war of 1870-71, the relative proportions of the
three arms in the German IInd Army were as follows: cavalry to infantry
as 1:8; and 3.4 guns per 1,000 men. The proportion between the
two principal arms in the IIIrd Army Corps of the German army, at the
outbreak of the Franco-German war, was as 1:18.8; on the first day of
the battle of Le Mans it was as 1:16.6; at the opening of the campaign
there were 4.6 guns per 1,000 men, at the close of the campaign 5.8 guns
per 1,000 men. This was still more marked in the Ist Bavarian Army
Corps, which, on October 31st, had 5.8 guns and on December 9th even
11.1 guns per 1,000 men. At present Germany has approximately 6, and
France 3.63 guns per 1,000 infantry.
The manner in which infantry fights imprints its distinguishing
mark on the tactics of an entire period; thus, according
to the combat formations of infantry, we may speak
of a period of "linear," "column," and "extended order" tactics.
Infantry can be equipped more cheaply and trained
