- tles of the Empire we find columns formed, which of necessity
excluded a large part of the men from participation in the action, but which were designed to break through the hostile battle line by sheer momentum. At Wagram, Macdonald's Corps was formed with eight deployed battalions in rear of each other in a single column, supported on the flanks by seven and eight battalions respectively, also in column. At Austerlitz and Waterloo we find attack formations in which from eight to twelve battalions of a division were deployed one in rear of the other at distances of twenty paces. Column and line must be examined with reference to their mobility, their vulnerability and their fire and shock power.
The column possesses greater mobility and is better adapted than the line for executing changes of front and for taking advantage of the cover afforded by the ground. In a column steadiness and shock power (produced by the crowding forward of the ranks in rear) and the influence exerted by the officers, is greater than in a line.
The line is more dependent on the terrain in its movements. The characteristics of the line are great frontal fire power, weakness of the flanks, difficulty of quickly changing front, and the ever present danger of being pierced The line has been called the formation of the bold, the column that of the weak.
The column[1] was proposed as a battle formation in France as early
as 1774 by Mesnil Durand, but did not find practical application until the
wars of the Revolution. In those wars columns were used because the
raw levies lacked the training necessary for making movements in line.
Whenever a line formation was used, battalions, owing to the scarcity of
efficient officers, resolved themselves into disorderly skirmish lines which
were exceedingly difficult to control. The adoption of the column was,
therefore, the result of practical experience, but as a formation it could
be justified on the battlefield only so long as it remained capable of development
for the purpose of firing. The endeavor to combine the advantages
of column and line by a combination of both formations led to the
- ↑ The development of the French column tactics is splendidly portrayed by Kuhl in his work Bonapartes erster Feldzug, 1796, p. 46, et seq.
