many others; all which he ſwallows ignorantly, and in the dark, without any wicked deſign.
If I ſhould ſay that perjury in this caſe is innocent, as to the perſon perjured, and that the whole ſin lies upon thoſe who enjoin it, I ſhould be catch'd up by ſome of my readers, as maintaining the ſame principles with our Jacobite High-Church prieſts, who have ſaddled all their late perjury upon the King who made the oath, applying the moſt christian reaſoning of ſage Huaïbras, ſo well known, upon this occaſion.
But, with my readers good leave, I think there is a great deal of difference between a man's calmly taking an oath, againſt the conviction of both his eyes and his conſcience, for ſordid lucre, or (to put the caſe in the beſt light) for fear of ſtarving; and another man's taking a blind oath, which he is unwarily led into, to obey a ſet of laws, which he reaſonably ſuppoſes are good laws, and conſiſtent with one another, (as any one would naturally conclude,) and for no ſordid end.
Indeed, the good men have got a pretty prevarication enough to excuſe their contradictory inconſiſtent ſtatutes, which is this: when a prior act, ſay they, is contradicted by a later one, the prior one is abrogated of courſe, without any formal repeal; or when a private ſtatute claſhes with the laws of the land, it is null of itſelf, as with the caſe of ſaying maſs, for which there ſtill is a ſtatute, to which we ſwear in the heap; but then we are told, that that ſtatute is of courſe abrogated by the Reformation.
Now, though this may be true enough in law, or in the nature and reaſon of things, yet I think at least, there would be no harm in having them formally aboliſhed, were it only becauſe they are uſeleſs; for it would remove all poſſible occaſion of complaint and reproach; it would ſatisfy ſcrupulous
