761 KANT " Project of Perpetual Peace." A severe re- view iu 1785 of Herder's " Philosophy of His- tory," called out the Hetakritik of that phi- losopher ; Herder was too cautions, courtly, and vague to suit the views of the rigid moralist and metaphysician. The end of the history of the world, according to Kant, is the forma- tion of the most perfect state constitution. Man, though free, is still bound to nature, and exists as a race. Every generation is a means of educating and developing the next genera- tion ; and man in the use of his freedom makes the powers of nature subservient to humanity. Perpetual peace among the nations can be in- sured only by a federation of free states. Pub- licity is necessary to political life and the highest good and progress of the state. The human race, as a whole, he contends, is in a constant progress to a better state. In later times this is proved by the general sympathy in the French revolution. (This is contained in his work on the " Strife of the Facul- ties.") Morals will penetrate more and more into political life, and shape the destiny of the race. This rapid and condensed outline of the works of Inimanuel Kant, though necessa- rily imperfect, may be sufficient to show the comprehensiveness and subtlety with which he penetrated into the most abstruse regions of thought. The influence of his speculations be- gan to be felt at the same time that the French revolution was changing the face of Europe, and when old chaos seemed to have again re- visited the earth. Materialism was predomi- nant in France ; in Scotland, Reid was com- bating skepticism on the principles of com- mon sense ; and an abstract dogmatism ruled the German mind. Here was a philosopher who, with unmatched analytic and synthetic powers, came forward to show to each previous and prevalent system its metes and bounds. Against the materialist and the skeptic, he proved that the mind had its a priori princi- ples of knowledge; against the dogmatist, ho maintained that the sphere of the supersensi- ble, though a reality, is not disclosed to posi- tive thought. He proved that empiricism is right so far as it asserts that the matter of our ideas is drawn from without, but wrong so far as it implies that their form can also there be found. And he is allied with the principle of the common-sense philosophy in ascribing an absolute validity to those moral ideas by which life is and must be guided. The utterances of this practical reason are true and valid, what- ever may be the difficulties of the theoretical reason. We must live and act in view of God, freedom, and immortality. His philosophy be- came the starting point for the most remark- able development of speculation since the days of the Greeks. German speculation was thoroughly quickened. Those who opposed Kant and those who espoused his views equal- ly acknowledged his greatness. Reinhold at first defended, and then modified his system. Schulze, Beck, and Bardili tried to bring it into more popular forms. Krug wrote a new " Organon," and Fries a now " Criticism of the Reason." Ilamann, Herder, and Jacobi developed their systems, which made faith the basis of philosophy, with constant reference to the principles of Kant. Herbart's positive philosophy claimed to have the true key to the Kantian metaphysics. Fichte unfolded his subjective idealism as the only logical re- sult of the critical philosophy. And even in some of the latest products of German specu- lation there are not wanting attempts to show that Kant lias not been superseded by any of his successors. As a teacher of philosophy in the university, the object of Kant was, as he him- self declares, not so much to give a system as to habituate his pupils to self-reflection. The teacher should not give thoughts, but lead to thought; he should not carry, but guide, his hearers; and hence the profounder parts of his system were rarely expounded to his classes. He was very simple in his whole style of lec- turing. His voice was feeble, and only gradu- ally rose with his subject. A few notes on bits of paper, or text books marked in the margin, were his materials. He always began on a subject as if thinking it out for himself ; announced his topic, gave provisional explana- tions, illustrated it in a great variety of aspects, and thus led his hearers along with him. Ho despised all the arts of the rhetorician. In developing his ethical theory he often rose to the highest degree of moral earnestness, speak- ing to the soul against all selfishness and in favor of liberty ; and then he seemed, says one of his hearers, " as if inspired by a divine flame." To aid his thoughts he would fix his attention closely on some one auditor, and judge by him whether he was understood. Once a button on a student's coat, which he had made his fixed point of vision, being lost, disconcerted the philosopher and interrupted the lecture. A tower on which he used to gaze in his reveries at home having become hidden by the growth of trees, he could not rest until the foliage was cut away. He was always kind to the students, but from principle would not remit their fees, lest they might lose their sense of independence. Tempting offers were made to him to quit Konigsberg (a double salary at Halle in 1778 by his friend the minister Von Zedlitz), but he did not care for the money, and disliked all change. In fact, he never went more than 40 miles from his native city. In his person he was slight- ly built, not much over five feet in height ; his chest was hollow, and his right shoulder, like that of Schleiermacher, projected much above the other. His features were fine and deli- cate; his complexion was light; his blue eyes expressed animation and kindness ; a high and broad forehead indicated his thoughtful and speculative turn ; and the lower part of the countenance showed a tenacious vitality. The external life of the philosopher, who was thus probing the depths of human consciousness,
