780 GETTYSBURG (BATTLE OF) commanded the Union army, broke up his camp opposite Fredericksburg, and moved northward, on a line parallel with that of Lee, the Blue Ridge being between them. Lee en- deavored by an ostentatious stretching out of his force to induce Hooker to pass the moun- tains and assail him. Finding this unavailing, he moved toward the Potomac, Winchester being the point of concentration of all his corps. Milroy, with 10,000 men, had been ly- ing here, where on June 15 he was assailed by the confederate van, and his force dis- persed, losing 2,300 prisoners. Raids were then made into Maryland and Pennsylvania, meeting with so little resistance that an inva- sion in force of Pennsylvania was resolved upon. On the 24th and 25th the Potomac was crossed at two points, almost within sight of the battle field of Antietam. The two columns, uniting at Hagerstown, Md., pressed on to- ward Chambersburg, Pa. Hooker on the 28th also crossed the river lower down, and headed toward Frederick City, Md. Lee had by this time gone so far from the river as to leave his communications exposed, and Hooker resolved to fall upon these rather than precipitate a general battle. There were at this time 10,000 Union troops at Harper's Ferry, who could be of no use there. Hooker asked that these should be united with his army. The request was refused by Halleck, who was then gene- ral-in-chief, and Hooker thereupon sent in his resignation, which was accepted, and on June 28 Meade was appointed in his place. The confederate corps of Ewell had in the mean while reached Carlisle, Pa., and was preparing to advance to Harrisburg, while Longstreet and Hill halted at Chambersburg. The posi- tion was now such that Meade by a rapid march could throw his whole force in Lee's rear, isolating him in a hostile country, and cutting off his sources of supply. Lee per- ceived that the movement northward could be carried no further until he had routed the army which hung menacingly upon his flank and rear ; and he resolved to concentrate his whole force in the direction of the enemy, Gettys- burg being fixed upon as the place of union. Meade, learning of this movement, resolved to concentrate his columns, which were spread over a wide space, a part under Reynolds being at Gettysburg, and a part under Sedg- wick 35 m. southward. The advance was to be drawn back, and the rear brought forward to a point on Pipe creek, 15 m. S. E. of Get- tysburg, where Meade resolved to await the attack of the enemy. Lee was wholly igno- rant of the position of his enemy ; for when he crossed the Potomac, Stuart with the cav- alry had been left behind to harass the Union rear, in Virginia, and then to cross the river and rejoin the army at Carlisle. Stuart, cross- ing at a point below that where Hooker had just crossed, found the enemy between him and Lee, and could reach Carlisle only by making a wide detour ; on reaching it, July 1, he found it evacuated, and the army in movement toward Gettysburg, whither he hastened, but arrived too late to take part in the actions of the first two days. JULY 1. On the morning of July 1 Hill, whose corps was in the advance, learned that Gettysburg, from which he was distant about 6 m., was occupied by a Union force. Sending back to urge Longstreet to hasten his march, he moved on. In the mean while Rey- nolds had sent out a cavalry reconnoissance in the direction whence Hill was coming, and the forces came in collision about 2 m. N. W. of Gettysburg. Reynolds sent infantry to the support of his cavalry, and the action opened. He was killed at the beginning of the fight, and the command here devolved upon Howard. At first the Union forces were superior, and they gained decided advantages, taking nearly 1,000 prisoners. But in a few hours nearly , the whole of Hill's corps came up from Cham- bersburg, and Swell's from Carlisle, both num- bering about 50,000, while their opponents were less than half as many. The Union force was driven back in confusion through Gettys- burg, losing about 5,000 prisoners. The re- mainder took up a strong position on Culp's hill, just south of the town. The Union loss in this action was about 10,000, half of whom were killed and wounded. The confederate loss in killed and wounded was probably some- what greater ; in prisoners much less. Meade, who was 15 m. distant, had learned that there was fighting at Gettysburg, and sent Hancock with orders to take command of the force there, and to decide what should be done ; for, as it happened, Meade knew nothing of Get- tysburg. Hancock decided that this was the place to give battle, and sent back word to Meade to hurry all his troops to the place. Some of these came up during the night, others early in the following morning, and finally, after a march of 35 m., Sedgwick's corps in the afternoon. Lee had in the mean while suspended operations until he could bring up his whole army. JULY 2. Early in the morn- ing the bulk of the two armies was in position. Southward of Gettysburg, at the distance of a mile, rises Cemetery ridge. It curves first north- ward, then westward, and finally runs south- ward, the whole length being about 3 m., the shape being like a fish hook. It rises in places into several craggy hills, each having its own name. That on the extreme south, forming the stem of the fish hook, is Round Top, sepa- rated by a ravine from Little Round Top ; at the bend of the hook is Cemetery hill ; Culp's hill forms the barb. The Union army was posted along the whole line of Cemetery ridge. Op- posite this is Seminary ridge, upon which the greater part of Lee's army was posted ; Ewell's corps, however, lay at the foot of Culp's hill, 2 m. distant. The forces present or close at hand were about equal, each numbering from 70,000 to 80,000 infantry and artillery. Be- tween the two ridges is a valley in which and on the slope of Cemetery ridge were fought the
