782 GETTYSBURG (BATTLE OF) actions of July 2 and 3. It is clear from what followed that Lee greatly underestimated the force opposed to him, and he resolved to attack it in its strong position. Longstreet was to assail the Union left at Eound Top, while Ewell was to make on the right, at Gulp's hill, "a demonstration, to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer." Meade had intended that his line should be posted on the ridge directly between Round Top and Ceme- tery hill. But this ridge, in the centre where Sickles was placed, is comparatively low, sink- ing down into a valley a few hundred yards wide, beyond which rises another wooded crest running diagonally to the former ; and Sickles supposed this to be the one which he was to oc- cupy. Before the error could be corrected the confederate attack had begun, and Meade de- cided to support Sickles in his present position, although it left an unoccupied space between him and Round Top. As it happened, Hood's division of Longstreet's corps struck this open- ing. Moreover, by some mischance Little Round Top had been left unoccupied, and this was the key to the entire Union position ; for if the enemy could seize this, and place a few guns upon it, the whole line would be enfiladed. The confederates perceived this, and began to swarm up the rugged sides. But just in time Warren, who as engineer was examining the line, discovered the error, and brought up a few regiments. They reached the summit just a moment ahead of the enemy, and forced them back. Again and again until nightfall the assault was unsuccessfully renewed. In the mean time the remainder of Longstreet's corps were pressing fiercely upon Sickles, who was soon borne from the field with his leg shattered. His corps made a stubborn resistance, but was forced back until it reached the crest of the ridge, where a new line was formed. The con- federates charged this, but were met with a fire from which they recoiled. Hancock, who now commanded the centre, ordered a counter- charge, by which the enemy were driven back to the ridge previously occupied by Sickles, which they continued to hold. Swell's demonstration on the Union right was delayed until the action on the left was nearly over ; but as most of the Union force had been withdrawn from Gulp's hill to aid Sickles, he succeeded in effecting a lodgment within the Union intrenchments. The Union loss in this action was fully 10,000, half of which was in Sickles's corps, which lost nearly half its numbers. This action decided nothing; for the ground which the confede- rates had won on the Union left was never meant to be held by Meade, and he would gladly have withdrawn from it without a fight ; and Swell's foothold on the Union right was of no importance unless it could be followed up. Still the confederates had gained some apparent advantages; and, says Lee, "These partial successes determined me to continue the assault the next day." From what he could then know, he was justified in this; for he had every reason to suppose that he had encounter- ed the entire Union force, while less than half of his own had been engaged. JULY 3. Lee's general plan of attack was similar to that of the preceding day. Ewell was to follow up his advantage, while the main attack was to be made on the centre. But early in the morning Meade had taken the offensive against Ewell, and forced him from the foothold which he had gained. By some unexplained accident Lee was never informed of this mishap, by which a third of his force was left out of ac- tion, while Meade was at liberty to concentrate his whole strength upon any point which might be assailed. All the morning was spent in preparation. Seminary ridge formed an admi- rable position for the confederate artillery, and here directly in front of the Union line they placed 120 guns. A great part of Cem- etery ridge is so rugged that artillery could not be placed there ; so that although Meade had 200 guns, he could use only 80 at a time. At 1 o'clock the confederates opened fire, which was immediately returned. Many of the Union guns were disabled, but their place was sup- plied by others. The infantry were so well sheltered behind the crest that they suffered little. After two hours, Hunt, the chief of ar- tillery, gradually suspended fire, "in order to see what the enemy were going to do." Lee, supposing that the Union batteries had been silenced and that the infantry must be demor- alized, now ordered the grand attack of the day. This was to be made mainly by Pickett's division of Virginia veterans, who had not yet been engaged. They were to be aided by the brigades of Wilcox and Pettigrew. Exclusive of Wilcox, who did not fairly advance, the at- tacking column numbered about 18,000. Lee had intended to advance his artillery to sup- port the infantry, but found at the last moment that the ammunition was nearly exhausted, and there was no time to replenish it. The column moved swiftly down the slope of the ridge, and across the plain. All the Union batteries, from Round Top to Cemetery hill, opened upon them, ploughing great furrows through their lines, which were closed up as fast as made. The column at first headed for the left of the Union centre, where Doubleday was posted with 2,500 men, a little in advance of the main line and protected by breast works of rails and stones. To avoid this the column bent to its left and exposed itself to a severe flank fire. Still it pressed on, until Pettigrew's brigade was with- in 300 yards of Hancock's line, which had re- served its fire. In five minutes the whole brigade was streaming back in wild disorder. Pickett's division pressed steadily on until it reached Gibbon's front line thinly posted be- hind a low stone wall. They charged straight over this, among the federal batteries, and for a quarter of an hour there was a struggle with pistols and clubbed muskets. The Union troops hurried from all sides and drove the enemy back down the slope, which was completely
