HANNIBAL 443 to the Trebia. The Eomans now armed to defend the lines of the Apennines, sending Servilius and Flaminius, the new consuls of the year 217, to Umbria and Etruria, on either of which an attack was expected. Hannibal chose a western passage over the mountains, where he lost all his remaining elephants but one, and having crossed the marshy environs of the Arno, during which perilous march he lost his right eye, he passed by the camp of Flaminius at Arretium (Arezzo), and finally enticed him from his position into a defile be- tween Cortona and Lake Thrasymenus (now the lake of Perugia), where the Romans were suddenly attacked by the Carthaginians in front and rear. Half of the Roman army, to- gether with the consul, perished by the sword or in the lake, and the other half was captured. Four thousand horsemen, the vanguard of Ser- vilius, who was hastening from Umbria to aid his colleague, arrived only to meet the same fate. Rome trembled, and imagined Hanni- bal already before its gates. {Hannibal ante portas became afterward a proverb.) Q. Fa- bius Maximus Verrucosus was proclaimed pro- dictator by the senate, and the city was forti- fied. But the conqueror, who knew Rome and the power of its despair, having made an un- successful attempt to besiege Spoletum, re- solved to detach the subjects and allies of Eome from its interest before attacking the city itself. He therefore crossed over to Pice- num, and carried terror and devastation into the lands of the faithful confederates of Rome in central Italy. Fabius now marched against him, and, with that cautious slowness which won him the surname of Cunctator (the De- layer), closely followed all his motions, hover- ing around him like "a cloud on the moun- tains," deterring the towns from defection, but carefully avoiding the risk of a decisive battle. By thus keeping Hannibal continually at bay, he procured Rome time for greater armaments. Once he had even the good fortune to surround him closely in a narrow mountain pass ; but nibal saved himself by having 2,000 oxen burning fagots around their horns driven n an eminence, which, making the enemy believe that a sally was intended on that side, induced him to quit one of his main positions. Dissatisfied with the slowness of Fabius, Mi- nucius, his master of the horse, attacked the enemy in his absence at Geronium, and for a trifling success was rewarded by the peo- ple of Rome with an equal share in the su- preme command. This emboldened him to attempt another attack, and he was soon en- snared and routed by Hannibal, being saved from total ruin only by Fabius, who hastened to the rescue of his rival. Hannibal regarded this as a defeat by Fabius. " I told you," he said, "the cloud of the mountains would shed its lightnings." He wrote to Carthage for re- enforcements and money ; the government refused to send any, for none were needed, bis enemies said, after such victories. Hasdru- bal, his brother, was fully engaged in Spain by the brothers P. Cornelius and Cneius Scipio. A decisive battle was deemed necessary by Han- nibal to destroy the Roman confederacy. The rashness of C. Terentius Varro, one of the con- suls of the year 216, soon ottered an opportu- nity for striking a great blow, of which Han- nibal well knew how to avail himself. The battle was fought in Apulia, near Cannse, on the banks of the Aufidus (Ofanto). The two consuls, L. ^Emilius Paulus and Varro, com- manded more than 80,000 men; the Cartha- ginian generals, Hannibal, Mago, Maharbal, Hanno, and another Hasdrubal, 50,000. Skil- ful disposition, stratagem, and the Numidian cavalry decided the day in favor of the Car- thaginians. ^Emilius Paulus, who died the death of a hero, 21 military tribunes, 80 sen- ators, and numberless knights were among the 50,000, or, according to others, 70,000 Roman victims of the carnage. Only scattered rem- nants escaped, among them Varro, who now received the thanks of the senate quod de republica non desperasset. This indomitable spirit of the Romans, as well as his own heavy loss, still prevented Hannibal from following the advice of Barca to march immediately upon Rome. He was for the present satisfied with the possession of southern Italy, and entered Capua, which opened its gates, to give rest to his troops. But the rich and luxurious metrop- olis of Campania proved fatal to their disci- pline and health, and desertion thinned their ranks. Hannibal had passed the zenith of his good fortune. Marcellus, the sword of Rome, while Fabius continued to be its shield, re- pulsed him from Nola, and besieged and con- quered Syracuse (214-212), a newly gained ally of Hannibal, while another ally, Philip of Macedon, was prevented from fulfilling his promises of aid. Hasdrubal in Spain fought with varying success, P. Cornelius Scipio, the son, recovering what his father and uncle had lost when they fell. Sardinia and the whole of Sicily were soon in the hands of the Romans, who began to harass the coasts of Africa. While Hannibal was effecting his successful march to Tarentum and its occupation (212), other towns were lost. Capua was besieged and hard pressed. Unable to dislodge the be- siegers, he suddenly marched toward Rome, and really appeared before its gates (211), but this diversion remained fruitless. The siege of Capua was not raised, and both that city and Tarentum were lost ; and after a victory at Her- donea (210), Hannibal had to keep himself on the defensive in Apulia, Lucania, and Bruttium. His most dangerous enemy, Marcellus, however, fell into an ambuscade near Venusia, and was slain (208). This was one of Hannibal's last achievements in Italy. His hopes rested on the approach of his brother from Spain with a mighty army ; but the consuls Livius and Clau- dius Nero, the latter of whom secretly hastened from the south, where he was observing Han- nibal, to aid his colleague in the north, de-
