610 HEGEL subject, and as such contains the principle and law of its own evolution. This law is a per- petual trichotomy thesis, antithesis, synthesis. Accordingly the " Encyclopedia " has three main parts, viz.: "Logic," the "Philosophy of Nature," and the " Philosophy of Spirit." Each of these has, again, a threefold division ; and these three yet other three ; and this rhythm of triads makes the harmony of the system. Logic, as we have already indicated, presents this absolute spirit or idea, as it is in itself, in its shadowy, ghostly form. In the "Philosophy of Nature" we have the same idea in its objective manifestation, in the forms of space and 'time. Here the idea or spirit be- comes, as it were, a stranger fo itself, yet this, too, by an inward necessity. How it comes to do this is one of the knots of the system ; but that it does so is evident from the fact that nature is. Nature is here reconstructed or, Hegel would say, we see how it is constructed according to the high a priori method, in its three departments of mechanics, physics, and organized beings. These refined demon- strations have not had much effect upon the naturalists. But the absolute spirit, having run through the round of nature, emerges into its third sphere (in an equally recondite way), that of mind or spirit itself; spirit here finds and knows itself, of course, in three sta- dia. First, it is subjective spirit, including an- thropology, phenomenology, and psychology. Then it passes over into objective spirit, or the sphere of ethics, which has three sub- divisions : 1, law or right; 2, morality, pri- vate and personal; 3, public ethics, including the family, society, and the state. In fine, spirit becomes absolute spirit, and as such shows itself in three modes, art, religion, and philosophy ; and in the last the circle is com- pleted, the end returns to the beginning, the absolute spirit knows itself, and the Hegelian system is all in all. This " Encyclopaedia " was first issued while Hegel was in Heidel- berg, where he became a professor in 1816, declining invitations to Erlangen and Berlin the latter, it is said, in part because the Prus- sian minister proposed that he should be ex- amined as to his capacity for lecturing after his eight years' seclusion in Nuremberg. His fame now rose rapidly. His disciples began to be ardent and prophetic. His system was pro- claimed as completing the structure of German idealism. Kant had critically prepared the way; Fichte had taught a subjective idealism; Schelling had not risen above an objective ideal- ism; but in the absolute idealism the partial was dethroned and the universal made supreme. Cousin, passing through Heidelberg, proclaim- ed to the world that in Hegel (whose "Logic" he said he could not grasp) he had found a man of genius; and in his later brilliant course at Paris, in 1828, he availed himself of the gen- eralizations and methods of the great idealist for the interpretation of history and the his- tory of philosophy. A second invitation to Berlin in 1818, urged by the minister Von Altenstein, Hegel's warm personal friend, was welcomed by him. He was now in the ripe- ness of his manhood, and animated by the con- sciousness that all thought had found its culmi- nation in him. As the devoted Michelet has it, he was " the crown of the whole past and the seed of the most fruitful future." His new position was most favorable for the prop- agation of his opinions. Berlin university had always been enthusiastic for speculation. His lectures soon became the rage. Officers of state and the literati and savants of Berlin sat on the students' benches. The govern- ment provided liberally for his salary, and also for journeys to Paris, Holland, &c. He took the bearing of the founder of a new and great school. Hegelianism was the road to office. The master became sometimes overbearing; even Varnhagen von Ense says that he was " tyrannical." Professor Gans was one of his most zealous disciples, but Hegel called him to a sharp account for having dared to " recom- mend," on the university bulletin, his work on ethics. " What had he done, that Gans should recommend him ! " He mixed more freely in general society, and indulged himself in his two chief relaxations, snuff-taking and card- playing. His previous lectures on the differ- ent branches of philosophy were carefully re- vised, and he wrote two new courses, on the "Philosophy of Religion" in 1821, and on the " Philosophy of History" in 1827, in both of these branches introducing an original and scientific elaboration of the materials. His "Outlines of the Philosophy of Right" was issued in 1821, combining in one exposition natural rights, ethics, and the philosophy of society and the state. Man's moral being ex- presses itself completely in the state; to this, natural rights, private morals, and even the church, are rightfully subordinate. The pref- ace to this work aroused more controversy than the work itself, since it summed up its teachings in the noted aphorism : " The ra- tional is actual, and the actual is rational." This was interpreted in an ultra-conservative sense ; explained in any different sense, it was a mere truism. In fact, he was understood as supporting the existing Prussian system as the perfection of reason and freedom. This for a time helped his metaphysics; though his ex- treme disciples soon "changed all that." He used to fight his battles in his prefaces^ In a preface he declared against the position of Schleiermacher, that the feeling of absolute dependence is the essence of religion. These two men were then at the height of their fame, both at Berlin ; neither liked the other, and their disciples have perpetuated the struggle to the present time. The theologian opposed the admission of the philosopher into the academy of science ; and the philosopher would riot al- low the theologian to take part in his scientific journal. The real difficulty was that Schleier- macher tried to find in human nature a foot-
