430 PHILOSOPHY hatli reference to the reason" (Bacon); "the science of things, evidently deduced from first principles" (Descartes); "the science of ef- fects by their causes, and of causes hy their effects" (Hobbes); "the science of sufficient reasons" (Leibnitz); "the science of things possible in so far as they are possible " (Wolf) ; "the science of the connecting principles of nature " (Adam Smith) ; " the science of truths, sensible and abstract" (Condillac); "the science of the relations of all knowledge to the ne- cessary ends of human reason " (Kant) ; " the science of the original form of the Ego, or men- tal self " (Krug, with which that of Fichte sub- stantially agrees) ; " the science of the absolute, or of the absolute indifference of the ideal and real " (Schelling) ; " the science of reason, in so far as the latter is the conscious idea of universal being in its necessary development " (Hegel) ; " the substitution of true ideas, that is, of necessary truths of reason, in place of the oversights of popular opinion and the errors of psychological science " (Ferrier) ; " the knowl- edge of effects as dependent on their causes " (Sir William Hamilton); "the science of first principles, that, namely, which investigates the primary grounds, and determines the funda- mental certainty, of human knowledge gen- erally " (Morell) ; " the science of the ultimate principles and laws of nature and fredom, as also of their mutual relations " (Tennemann) ; " the science of the reason of things " (Alaux) ; " the explanation of the phenomena of the uni- verse " (Lewes) ; " the thinking consideration of things," or "reflection" (Schwegler); "the science of principles " (Ueberweg). From these definitions it will be seen that the term philos- ophy, which first appears in Greek literature in Herodotus, has retained a generic signifi- cance, modified by special application. Ac- cording to Plato it is the search for wisdom, or true knowledge, which he distinguishes from belief or opinion founded on the evidence of the senses. With the reality underlying all sensible forms wisdom is alone concerned, and to ascertain and acquire this is the task of philosophy. This grasps what is immuta- ble and eternal, in which are included alike all truths of mathematics as well as of theolo- gy. Philosophers "set their affections on that which in each case really exists." Aristotle holds that, as all sciences deal with distinct departments of existence, there must be a science which deals with the reality that un- derlies them all, or being as such, and this science he terms his " first philosophy." Phi- losophy therefore is equivalent to a knowledge of things in their origin or causes, a view sub- stantially accepted by Sir William Hamilton. The usage of the term, however, especially among the stoics and ethical writers, has been in the subjective sense of Plato, and has been applied to the sagacity or disposition best adapted to solve the problems of practical life. In this case the moral element has predomi- nated over the intellectual. But as applied to systems of thought or speculation, the term has been used in an objective sense, and has been equivalent to a theory for the explana- tion of phenomena, whatever these might be, whether related to God, the origin and order of the world, or the constitution, powers, and destiny of the human soul. In each instance there is an effort to trace things to their causes, to study them in their connections, to interpret them to the reason, and through their multiplicity to discover the higher unity that underlies them. Method. The rational pro- gress necessary to this end constitutes method in philosophy. This is the same whether we seek to discover causes or to resolve the mani- fold into unity, since as we ascend from cause to cause we approach the unity of which we are in search. Method then involves two cor- relative processes, known as analysis and syn- thesis ; the first fundamental, and in order to the latter. Having before us the complex of phenomena, as they are presented to sense or consciousness, we analyze them, or examine the distinct elements of the comple* object, that we may apprehend them individually. Synthesis receives these elements from analy- sis, and recomposes them, on the basis of com- mon qualities or relations in the elements themselves. Thus analysis selects from the infinity of objects those to be considered, from which a general law may be inferred, and this inference, known as induction, is pronounced by Hamilton to be " purely a synthetic pro- cess." Analysis and synthesis are dependent upon each other, and either alone would be incomplete. They answer, as terms, to Bacon's " observation and induction." A more minute statement of the actual procedure in philoso- phizing has been : 1, observation ; 2, hy- pothesis ; 3, questioning ; 4, induction ; but all are implied in analysis and synthesis. Domain. The domain of philosophy is the universe of phenomena, including facts of consciousness, so far as they come or can be brought under human cognizance. Instead of being limited to a single department, like a special science, it includes all departments of knowledge. The- ology, as Plato held, comes within its sphere, so far as its facts or doctrines are objects which reason can examine or explain. This is the case also with ethics. But a distinction must be made. Philosophy is not to be identified with religion or science, while religious truth, as such, is addressed rather to the intuitions of the soul than to the speculative reason, and expounds the duty of man and the dogmas postulated by revelation, upon which that duty is based ; and while science searches out facts in its own sphere, and by inductive processes discovers the law under which they are classi- fied, or the theory to which they conform, the sphere of philosophy comprehends both, ac- cepting their facts, intuitions, or laws as its data, and studying them in their causes and relations, in connection with the question of their ultimate significance. Science, limited
