Page:The Annual Register 1758.djvu/17

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HISTORY OF THE WAR.
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in this contest. It is evident enough, that the consideration of the right had much less influence on both parties than the consideration of conveniency. Should the French be able to unite Canada to their colonies at the mouth of Missisippi, by a possession of all that vast country which lies between them, the English colonies must lose all share in the Indian trade in time of peace; and in time of war be exposed to continual dangers, or to the ruinously chargeable defence of a frontier more than 1500 miles in length. If on the contrary, the French should fail to make good these claims on the Ohio, and those on Nova Scotia, their two colonies, entirely disunited, and the entrance into one shut up for the winter season by frost, and the entrance into the other difficult in all seasons by the banks at the mouth of the Missisippi, must certainly lose all their value to France, and in their fall involve much of the fortune of their great settlements in the West Indies.

Both nations being fully persuaded of this, no longer looked on the affair of the Ohio as a matter of indifference. They prepared to cut the gordian knot of the long and intricate negociation by the sword. Ships were fitted out, and some troops silently sent off from Brest. General Braddock sailed to Virginia 1755. with about 1500 regular troops; 24 men of war under the Admirals Boscawen and Mostyn were ordered to America, to intercept the French supplies. Orders were sent to our colonies to arm; and three operations were actually undertaken, one against Fort du Quesne under Braddock; the other two against the French forts in Nova Scotia, and the fort of Crown Point on the frontiers of New York. The two courts in the mean time breathed nothing but peace, and exchanged reciprocal professions of friendship and good will, which deceived neither party.

They who are of opinion that the passions and characters of the ruling men, influence all public concerns as much as the public interests themselves, thought they saw other causes operating to hasten this breach. On the death of a great minister, which happened some time before, the administration was new moulded. Some persons then taken in, were considered as belonging to a party not perfectly united with the remains of the old administration. It was thought that the leading man of this party proposed to work out the old servants of the crown, in order to make way for a more uniform system. As long as peace subsists government is supported by itself; and any change is difficult. But the conduct of a war is a thing critical to a ministry. The leader of this party therefore, conscious of his own talents, which all men acknowledged to be conspicuous, and of his connexions, which were considerable, warmly pushed on a war, seconded by the fairness of the public motives, and the general voice of the people. In this war his friends relied that things must necessarily be so embarrassed, that the old party would find themselves obliged to retire, and to leave the stage clear for them to serve their country according to their own plans, and on their own terms. This design was believed to be pushed forward by another great man of that party, who had played a game nearly of the same kind before, and in whom an advanced age had not abated any thing of his natural fire and love of violent councils.