£ 311 ]
Literary and Mifcellaneous Eflays.
THIS head of our coUeftion is not of fo uniform a nature as the foregoing divifions. But vve have endeavoured at as much order in the difpofition of the feveral pieces which cnmpofe it, as the diverfity of the fubje6ls would admit; The firft piece we give is upon the fubje£l of Tafte. It is faying enough in its praife, to fay it is written by Monf. de Montefquieu, who fo hap- pily employed philofophy to illuftrate and improve the laws of all the nations of the world. So far as this piece goes, (for it is but a fragment) he employs philofophy with equal happinefs to ex- plain and improve the polite arts. As the piece is long, we have in fome places abridged it. In fome few places it may poflibly feem a little obfcure. If any blame fliould, on that account, be laid on the tranflator, we muft not forget that the excellent author him- felf, through an extreme refinem.ent, was not wholly free from obfcurity.
An Essay on Taste.
TASTE, in the moil general definition of it, without con- fidering whether good or bad, jult or not jull:, is that which attaches us to a thing by fentiment ; which does not hinder its being applied to intelleftual things, the know- ledge of which gives fo muchplea- fure to the foul, that it was the only happinefs that certain philo- fophers^could conceive. The foul receives her knowledge through her ideas and through her fentiments ; fhe receives certain pleafures thro' thefe ideas and thefe fentiments. For although we oppofe idea to fentiment, yet when the foul fees a thing, (he feels it ; and there is nothing fo intelledlual, that flie does not fee, or thinks flie fees, and confequ&ntly that flie does not feel.
Of curiofity.
Our foul is made for thinking ; that is to fay, for making difcove- ries. Such a being ought then to have curiofity ; for as all things are in a chain, where each idea pre- cedes one, and follows another idea, you cannot leave the fight of one thing without having a defire to fee another ; and if we had not this defire of feeing more, we fhould not have had any pleafure in feeing what we do fee. Thus when a part of a picture is fhewn to us, our defire to fee the part which is yet concealed, is in proportion to the pleafure we have had in what was Ihewn to us.
It is then the pleafure we have in one obje£l that leads us towards another. Hence it is, that the foul always feeks novelty, and is never at relf. Thus will you be fure to delight the foul, when you X 4 make
