HISTORY OF THE WAR.
49
M. Daun was Toon apprifed of the King of PrulTia's intentions; but he confidered that if he was to purfae the King into Si'.efia, he mul'c en- counter with difficaities almoit in- fuperabie; feveral ftrong places ftood in his way, and it would prove eafy for the Pruflian troops left for the defence of that duchy, to take an advantageous camp under one of thofe places, and thus oblige them to waire unprolitably their time, which might be employed in the execution of more judicious projefts. Befides, that in this manner of proceeding he could never act in concert, nor preferve any effectual communication with the feveral bodies of his allies. To pu!h forward with his whole force diredly to Berlin, could at bell be regarded as a coup de main, which could prove nothing decifive in the campaign, even fuppofing the pro- ject fhould fucceed; but it was rather probable that it would not fucceed, as the King of Prufiia might clear his hands of the Ruf- fians, before the army of M. Daun could, for want of fubfiiK'nce, ar- rive in the Lower Lufatia. Every confideration therefore pointed out the relief of Saxony as the great object of the Auftrian op -radons. It was an objedt apparently to be com palled with greater eafe, and if compalTed, produdtive of more folid advantages than any other. The army of the Empire, already faperior to that of Prince Henry, could co-operate in the defign, and the recovery of Saxony once eifedl- ed, the King of Pruffia would fee himfelf entirely diverted of one of the principal refources he had to rely upon in the war, for money, provifions, and forage; whilll his hereditary dominions, ftripped of this ftrong barrier, defencelefs in Vol. r.
themfelves, and aiT.iulted on thres iides by powerful armies, could fcarce find them employment to the end of the campaign.
IvI. Daun having refolved upon this plan of operations, faJered the King of Prulfia to continue his march towards the Raflians, with- out any rnolellid jn : he contented himfelf with leaving a confidcr ible body of troops under the gen,;ra}3 Harfch and de Ville, on the fouth- ern frontiers of SHefia, in order to form fome enterprife up:)n that fide, which might draw the attention and forces of the PruiTuns as far as po;Tib!e from the great obj.-d of his operations. When he naJ made thefe difpofuions, he march'd to- wards Saxony through the country of Lufatia by Zltta.i, Gorlitz, and Bau:zen. His ftril projedl was bold. He propofed to crofs the Elbe at Meiifen; by which the communi- cation between Drefden and Leipiic would be cut off at one ftroke. Then he propofed to attack Prince Henry in his camp at Sedlitz, while the army of the Empire fell upon him in another quarter. Thus the Prince vvas to be pat between two fires, and his retreat into Drefden to be rendered impr.icl:icable; but upon more mature confideration, this projeil was laid afide. M. Daun reflected that the fortrefs of Sonneftein, of which he was not yet in pofTeffion, would prove p no fmall impediment to ^" ^'
his defigns. He confidered that the poiition of Prince Henry oppofite to ^ the army of the Empire was too ad- vantageous, to make an attack upon him advifable; and unlefs the Prince could be induced to attack the Im- perialifts firft, a point not to be ex- pefted in his circumftances, he might always find it eafy to throw himfelf into Drefden, and by proper motions E " to
