HISTORY OF THE WAR.
the fpot; th?y had more than io,oco wounded, molt of them mortally; 939 officers, not includ- ing the inferior, were killed, wounded, and taken prifoners; of two particular r^^gimencs, confiil:- ing before the- battle of 4595 ef- fective men, only 1475 ^^'^^■^ left; tiieir whole lofs on this bloody day was 21,529 men. That of tiie Prufiians in every way did not amount to 2000.
The gazettes of both parties warmly dilputed the vain honour of the field of battle. On the moil diligent enquiry, it appears that both parties fpent the night on or \tTY near the place of action. But this is an aifair ot little confequence. The Pruffians had all the fruits, and molt of the proofs of a vidftory the molt comr, pleat and decifive. A valt train of artillery taken, the military cheft, a number of prifoners, many of them officers of high rank ; the retreat of the Rufllan army, the next and the following days ; their general Fer- mor's requeit tor leave to bury the dead; their incapacity to ad- vance or form any new enterprife ; the King of PrufTia's unmolelted operations againit his other ene- mies ; all thefe form the molt clear and certain demonltralion of a vic- tory in all points, for which a vic- tory is defirable.
Nothing lefs indeed than a very compleat victory could have done any efTential fervice to the Kino 's aftairs at that time, when four armies of his enemies were making their way to one common cen- ter, and threatened to unite in the heart of Brandenburg. The King renewed the attack on the Ruflians the next morning. The ever.t of the la it day had fhewed
them, that there w?.s no way of fafety but in a retreat, and in effect t'ley retreate.l before the Pruilians as far as Landfperg on the frontiers of Poland. I'he King of Prullia was convinced that their late check:^ muit wholly difable them from at- tempting any thing material againit- his dominions on that fide ; and he faw clearly that whatever he might-, hope to gain by improving his ad- vantage againit the Rafiians, he mull lofe far m.ore by allowing his other enemies to make a progrefs on the ftde of Saxony. He {atiified him- felf, rnerefore, with leaving a fmall body of troops under Count Dohna, to c.bferve the motions of the Muf- covite army; and marched v, iih the greateit part of his forces and the utmolt expedition to the relief of Prince Henry.
M. Daun having laid afide his firlt proje.^ for palling the Elbe at rvieiflen, enterprifed nothing new on the fide of Saxony for fome days ; he contented himfelf with taking a poiuion at Stolpen to the eallward of the Elbe, by which, whilit he preferved to himfelf an eafy communication with the army of the Empire, he interrupted the communication between Bautzen and Drefden ; he favoured the ope- rations of General Laudohn, who had advanced througn the Lovver Lufatia to the confines of Branden- burg; and by drawing the attention of the I ruffian forces wnica were left in Sileiia to the northward of that dutchy, he facilitated the pro- grefs oi the arms of the generals Harfch and de \ ille in the fouthern parts. Admirable difpofi ion? with- out queftion, if the time had not called for more vigorous mealures, and. if the refcue of Saxony from the King of Praffia iiad not been E 3 the
