HISTORY OF THE WAR.
^5
CHAP. XIII.
5*^? burning of the fiips at St. Malo. Taking of Cherhourg. Defeat at St. Cas. Operations in America. Siege and taking of Louijhourg. Englijh army defeated at Ticonderoga. They take Frontenac. The French abandon Fort da ^efne. C-onclufon of the annals of the year 1758.
IN the beginning of the year, the good conditicn of our navy and our army ; the fpirit and popularity of the miniftry ; the wife choice of commanders, in contempt of vul- gar and trivial maxims ; the preva- lence of the contrary to all thefe among the enemy; gave us the befl grounded hopes cf a vigorous and fucceisful campaign. Concerning the theatre cf our operations there was fome doubt. It was the opinion of feme, that our pulh in Europe fhould be made on the fide of Germany ; and that we ought to ftrengthen the army of Prince Fer- dinand with fuch a refpedlable body of troops, as might enable that finifhed commander to exert all his talents, and improve to the utmoft the advantages he had already ob- tained over the French. They ima- gined, that if an early and conlider- able reinforcement were fent to the prince, while the French army was yet in a diflrefTed condition, and if in this condition they Ihould receive any confiderable blow, they would find it extremely difficult to retrieve it; and receiving this blow on the frontier of their own territories, the prince might carry the war into France itfelf; and thus very pro- bably bring matters to a fpeedy de- cifion. That in purfuing this plan a diverfion on the coail of France was by no means excluded : and that on the contrary it murt, on this plan, be attended with confeqaences infi- nitely more important than it could otherwife ; that otherwife, France Vol. I.
might laugh at the little defultory efforts of a handful of men, who were to be embarked and difembark- ed with great difficulty and hazard, and which would always be obliged to fly at the firft approach of an ene- my. That whilfl: the French had only an army greatly inferior in number to engage on the fide of Germany, they would always find themlelves to be able to aft abroad, and defend themfelves at home.
On the other hand it was ftrong- \y urged, that we ought to make the dt'ftruiSlion of the French ma- rine our great objedl, and to confi- der all continental operations only in a fecondary light. That in fend- ing a large body of Englifh troops to the king's arn^ on the Rhine, we mud: neceffarily weaken our ef- forts in America, and on the coaft of France ; and by drawing away all cur forces, we muft fliake that internal fecurity, which invigorated ail our operations abroad. That whilft we maintained an army of 50,000 foreigners in Germany, it would be the greateft imprudence to fend alfo a large body of our own national troops into the fame country, and by that means not only fquander away our mer, but employ almofi: every penny granted for the land fervic-e out of Great- Britain ; a method which could not fail of exhauliing as in a very IhorC time. That th2 force already in Germany was fufficient to keep the French engaged, and that the propoftd expeditions to France
F would.
