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18. There are two points of view (1) that of the shipowners and their trade; (2) that of the Admiralty and the exigencies of the naval service.
(1) As regards the shipping trade, it appears to us that there is no apprehension to be felt in time of peace. . The trade is efficiently carried on, and there is no reason to suppose that the supply of foreign seamen available will run short. There appears to be no more real danger of scarcity of men in the event of a naval war. It is doubtful if even the subjects of the State with which we might be at war would desert their calling, and even so, the foreign seamen employed are of so many different nationalities that the supply would still be sufficient. It is worthy of notice that Swedes are the most numerous of all the foreign seamen employed on the 81st March, 1901, and that the Swedes, Norwegians, and Danes together amounted to more than one-third of the total number of foreigners employed [Parliamentary Return of 1902, Cd. 1,842, Table 4.] It is probable also that some ships of the mercantile marine would necessarily be laid up in time of war, and their crews added to the number of men available for employment; and if freights and wages rose the effect would be to draw men from shore into sea employment.
(2) As regards the naval service, the Committee appointed in 1902 to consider the question of naval reserves reported as follows with reference to the mercantile marine as a source of supply:
"In considering the extent to which the Navy should depend upon the mercantile marine, it has to be borne in mind that it is undesirable to draw too largely upon it for a reserve.
"One of the objects of a strong navy is to enable our merchant ships to keep the sea in time of war, and this object would be defeated if too many seamen and firemen were suddenly withdrawn from the mercantile marine, and a considerable portion of it laid up in consequence for want of crews. Under present conditions the Navy cannot be dependent for & reserve in upon this source, unless the mercantile marine becomes tactically a State-subsidised and State-regulated service; and even if this were done it would be necessary to provide a reserve for the mercantile marine to enable oversea trade to be carried: on in time of war.
"The mercantile marine is, and should continue to be, a valuable source from which to draw a portion of the Naval Reserve. The Committee feel that the numbers which at present come from this source may and should be increased; they desire to encourage the entry of men from it into the Naval Reserve, and to stimulate. future enrolment; but the present reserve is already drawn largely from other sources, and this must be still more the case with the larger reserves required in the near future.” [Parliamentary Return of 1908, Cd. 1,491, paragraphs 16, 17, 18.
19. It seems to us unlikely that in the event of any great naval war it would be practicable to draw men to any considerable extent from the crews of the sea-going vessels of the mercantile marine. At present the great mass of naval reserve men come from the fisherman and yachtsman class, and from the seamen on coasting vessels, and in case of war it is upon these classes that reliance must mainly be placed. (Appendix M, Nos. 21 and 22.) We were, however, struck with the comparatively small number of seamen from foreign-going ships in the Royal Naval Reserve, and we would recommend improved inducements and more active recruiting, which would doubtless result in an increase of this number.
20. But while on these two main points, we do not think that serious apprehension need be felt at the increase of foreigners; we are well aware that the question is not exhausted by these observations.
