Tacit acquiescence in a view which apparently contemplates an enemy roaming over the seas without et or hindrance, and his appearance in force without warning on any part of our coast, seems to have led to the construction of vessels with a restricted radius of operation and incapable of service in distant waters. The desire to have within sight, as it were, a portion of the fleet becomes at times exceedingly strong. Each locality demands a squadron for its special protection, and failing to obtain it, urges extensive fortification. The Admiralty, on the other hand, has always had a strong objection to the localisation of any portion of its force. During the Crimean War some uneasiness was felt on the coast of the United Kingdom and India at the absence of British ships. It was then pointed out by the naval authorities that more efficient protection was afforded to this country by confining Russian ships to their own ports than by distributing the British fleet along the east coast of England and Scotland. A similar explanation demonstrated that India was more efficiently protected by our squadron acting in the Chinese Seas than by stationing British ships in the Bay of Bengal. Periodically the same demand is made for local defence, and when ships are denied, an alternative is found in forts and submarine mines, whose principal merit is that they cannot be removed.
It has been asserted that ships being no longer dependent on the wind for propulsion there is an advantage to the side that contemplates attack. Lord
