his writings, and therefore 'tis likely if there were in reason a necessity of one onely world, that hee would have found out some such necessary proofe as might confirme it: Especially since hee labours for it so much in two whole Chapters.[1] But now all the arguments which he himselfe urges in this subject, are very weake and farre enough from having in them any convincing power. Therefore 'tis likely that a plurality of worlds doth not contradict any principle of reason. However, I will set downe the two chiefe of his arguments from his owne works, and from them you may guesse the force of the other.[2] The 1 is this, since every heavy body doth naturally tend downwards, and every light body upwards, what a hudling and confusion must there bee if there were two places for gravity and two places for lightneffe: for it
- ↑ De Cælo l. 1. c. 8. 9.
- ↑ Ibid.
