later firmans are revocable; and whether they were, at all events as regards the succession, ever strictly legal.
The principal claim of the firmans of 1866 and 1873 to our respect is, that they cost Egypt and Egyptian bondholders a vast sum of money. In consideration of that of 1866 an addition of £150,000 a-year was made to the Egyptian Tribute, and large sums were spent in the purchase of the influence at Constantinople necessary to obtain the Imperial sanction. For the firman of 1873 there was no overt bargain; but a large slice of the Oppenheim loan of that year was expended in procuring it. Having paid so heavily for the dislocation of the order of succession, the country and its creditors may consider that they have a right to the undisturbed enjoyment of what they bought. On the other hand they may be of opinion, looking at the results of their bargain, to which, albeit, they were not privy, that it is not worth while to throw "good money after bad" to keep it in force. We can discover in the firmans of 1866 and 1873 no other claims to respect either moral, material or even technical.
As to the expediency, there would be no question on this point if the next heir were manifestly a desirable person to occupy the throne. But all that can be said on this subject is that for the present he is a nullity, and that what he may be hereafter is a lottery. It certainly would not be easy to find a Regent. Nubar Pasha, the only qualified man whom Egypt furnishes, would not be acceptable either to
