refusing beforehand to make their faculties available, however distinguished they may be? And even if we could do without them, would it be consistent with justice to refuse to them their fair share of honour and distinction, or to deny to them the equal moral right of all human beings to choose their occupation (short of injury to others) according to their own preferences, at their own risk? Nor is the injustice confined to them: it is shared by those who are in a position to benefit by their services. To ordain that any kind of person shall not be physicians, or shall not be advocates, or shall not be members of Parliament, is to injure not them only, but all who employ physicians and advocates, or elect members of Parliament, and who are deprived of the stimulating effect of greater competition on the exertions of the competitors, as well as restricted to a narrower range of choice.'
These words of wisdom apply also to the great offices of the Church.
With regard to the second point in the feminist's economic code, her objection to the regulation of women's labour: her chief objection to this is simply that it puts women at a disadvantage in the competition for work and makes it more difficult for them to earn a living. This is sometimes true, and if it were possible to improve the condition of
