Historic Problems. 109
been different. His authority was ab- in the long and tedious siege of a
solute in Greece, and his resources powerful walled city. Secondly, Han-
without end. Even had he been beaten nibal had no engineers or apparatus for
in one or two battles, he could easily a siege, and no means to organize a
have summoned new contingents from force of this nature. Thirdly, the idea
Greece, from Macedon, from his Asiat- of twenty thousand regular troops, aided
ic territories. He could have piled in perhaps by as many irregular Italian
not merely thirty thousand Macedo- allies, even if they had possessed all
nians, but double that force, with myr- the necessary siege equipments, laying
iads of Syrians, Persians, and Greeks, leaguer to a city whose men vfere all
with chariots, elephants, and horsemen, warriors, and which could summon from
He could have exhausted the Roman her Italian tributaries two hundred and
armies in a twelve-month. Hannibal fifty thousand conscripts, is in itself pre-
was always m need of a good engineer posterous. Hannibal would have been
corps and siege apparatus. Alexander crushed in a moment,
possessed an excellent supply of these Hannibal excelled in the qualities of
accessories. He would have pressed a deplomat as well as those of a miU-
right on to the siege of Rome, and the tary chieftain. His emissaries were
Roman capital would have fallen as already at work among the Italian
Tyre fell. And the republic would cities. His great project was to raise
have expired when the capital fell. Italy in insurrection against Rome.
Another question that has been the The Roman conquests of that country
occasion of much dispute is the more had been so thorough, her system of
familiar one of Hannibal's chance of colonization so perfect, that Italy in
conquering Rome if he had not stopped one sense was Rome, and Rome Italy,
at Capua. It has always been fashion- Therefore, he could not hope to pre-
ble to suppose that Hannibal was guilty vail against Rome while all the Italian
of a great military error in going" into cities were free and ready to aid her.
winter quarters, and submitting his men He wished to detach them from their
to the luxuries and Circean blandish- allegiance to the republic, incorporate
ments of the splendid Campanian cap- their soldiers into his army, and then
ital. He should have marched on while he could march on to the capital with
Rome was paralyzed by the defeat of no enemy behind him. Meanwhile, he
Cannse, and attacked the capital itself, needed some city for headquarters ; and
But had Hannibal done this latter thing, Capua the opulent, Capua whose walls
instead of fifteen years of victorious were seven miles in circumference,
occupancy of Italy, he would have met Capua the second city of Italy in
with instantaneous and irrevocable de- strength and the first in wealth, offered
feat. In the first place, Hannibal's men suitable accommodations,
were mercenaries, Numidians and Span- That Hannibal's plans did not suc-
iards, fierce desert men and wilder clans- ceed was through no fault of his. Only
men from the hills of interior Spain, paltry aid was granted him by Car-
that he and his father had trained, thage. The Italian tribes, long held in
They were fitted only for fighting in subservience to the military despotism
the field, and had not the determina- of Rome, were slow to rally under the
tion and the pertinacity to participate Carthaginian banners. Lastly, the de-
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