of that skill and wisdom which would have ensured success, if the opposing armies had been greater or less.
If a timely fog did aid the retreat of Washington from Brooklyn, in 1776, so did a petty stream, filled to the brim by a midnight shower, make altogether desperate, if it did not, alone, change, the fortunes of Napoleon at Waterloo.
If, also, the siege of Yorktown, in 1781, was conducted by few against few, as compared with modern armies, it is well to note the historical fact that, at the second siege, in 1861, the same ravine was used by General Poe (United States Engineers) to connect "parallels." and thereby save a "regular approach." Numbers did not change relations, but simply augmented the physical force employed and imperilled.
He who can seize the local, incidental, and seemingly immaterial elements which enter into all human plans, and convert them into determining factors, is to be honored; but the man who can so anticipate the possibilities and risks which lie ahead, that the world counts as a miracle, or, at least, as marvelous, that which is only the legitimate result of faith, courage, and skill, is truly great. Washington did it. His retreat from Long Island was deliberately planned before he had a conference with his subordinates; and the entire policy and conduct of his operations at and near New York will defy criticism. To hold the facts of the issue discussed, right under the light of that military science (that is, that mental philosophy which does not change with physical modes and appliances), is simply to bring out clearly the necessity for the occupation of New York and Brooklyn by Washington in 1776.
The mere statement of the British forces which were available in 1776 will show that if Washington knew, in advance, exactly what he had to meet, then he had a right to anticipate a successful resistance. As early as July, 1775, he demanded that the army should be enlisted "for the war." In a previous article, the policy of the Commander-in-chief and of General Greene was noticed, and the formulated proposition, then accepted by both, gave vitality and hope to the struggle. When the issue ripened at New York, and, swiftly as possible, the besieging force before Boston became the resisting force at New York, there was one man who understood the exact issue. The temper of the British press, and that of the British House of Commons, was fully appreciated by the American Commander-in-chief. He knew that General Gage had urged that "thirty thousand men, promptly sent to America, would be the quickest way to save blood and end the war." He also knew that when John Wesley predicted that "neither twenty, forty, nor sixty thousand men would suppress the rebellion," the British Cabinet had placed before Parliament a careful statement of the entire resources which were deemed available for military purposes abroad. As early as May, 1776, Washington was advised of the following facts:—
First, That the contracts at that time made with continental States, including that with Hesse and Brunswick, would place at British disposal a nominal strength of fifty-five thousand men.
Second, That, with all due allowance for deficiencies, the effective force, as claimed by the ministry, could not exceed, but might fall below, forty thousand men.
The debate in Parliament was so sharp, and the details of the proposed
