at the same time, in England, not only a vigorous opposition to the use of force, but a clearly-defined exhibit of the maximum military resources which its authorities could call into exercise. Imminent European complications were already bristling for battle, both by land and sea. and Great Britain was without a continental ally or friend. As the British resources were thus definitely defined, so was the military policy distinctly stated; namely, to make, as the first objective, the recovery of New York, and its acceptance as the permanent base for prosecution of the war. The first blow was designed to be a fatal blow. It was for Washington to take the offensive. He did so, and by the occupation of New York and Brooklyn put himself in the attitude of resisting invasion, rather than as attempting the expulsion of a rightful British garrison from the British capital of its American colonies.
Not only did the metal of such men as he commanded stand fire on the seventeenth of June, 1775, at Breed's Hill, but when he followed up the expulsion of the garrison of Boston by the equally aggressive demonstrations at New York, he gave assurance of the thoroughness of his purpose to achieve independence, and thereby inspired confidence at home and abroad. The failure to realize a competent field force for the issue with Howe, and the circumstances of the retreat and evacuation, do not impair the statement that, in view of his knowledge of British resources and those of America, the occupation and defence of Brooklyn and New York was a military necessity, warranted by existing conditions, and not impaired by his disappointment in not securing a sufficient force to meet his enemy upon terms of equality and victory. It increases our admiration of that strategic forethought which habitually inspired him to maintain an aggressive attitude, until the surrender at Yorktown consummated his plans, and verified his wisdom and his faith.
