The Court of Star Chamber.
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THE COURT OF STAR CHAMBER. By John D. Lindsay. III.
IN 1453 a statute was passed (31 Hen. VI., c. 2) to give effect to the process by which persons were brought before the council. The act is very particular in its terms, and as it throws some light upon the nature of that jurisdiction, it may be proper to state it minutely. It recited that upon suggestions and complaints made as well to the king as to the lords of his council, against persons for riots, oppressions, and grievous offenses, by them done against the peace and laws, he used to give command ment, by writs under his great seal, and by his letters of privy seal, to appear before him in his chancery, or before him and his council, to answer for the above offenses; and because these writs had not been met with regular obedience it was now or dained, that where such writ or letter issued commanding anyone to appear before the king or his council, and the person refused to receive it, or withdrew himself, or did not appear, and such disobedience was duly certified to the council, then the chancellor should have power to direct writs of procla mation into the country where the party dwelt, or the next adjoining county, and also into London, commanding the sheriff, under the penalty of £200 to make open proclamation in the shire town, and in the city, three several days immediately after delivery of the writ for the party to appear before the council, or the chancellor, within a month after the last day of proclamation, the writ to be returned into 'the chancery within seven days after the proclamation under the same penalty. If the party did not appear within the prescribed time he was to forfeit, if a lord, all offices, fees, annuities and other posses
sions that he, or any one to his use, might have of grant from the crown, and if upon a second writ and proclamation he still made default, he forfeited his estate and name of lord, and place in parliament. If he had no grant from the crown, then he was to forfeit his name and estate of lord, and place in parliament, and also all his lands and tenements — but these forfeitures were only for life. If a commoner he was to be punished for disobedience of the first writ by a fine at the discretion of the two chief justices, but if he had no livelihood whereof to pay a fine he was to be put out of the king's protection. While Parliament thus gave new vigor and energy to the authority of the council, they did not forget the regard which should be paid to the courts of common law, for the statute in conclusion declares that no matter determinable by the law of the realm should be determined otherwise than by the course of the law in the king's courts. It appears from these parliamentary pro ceedings that as the constitution of the English legal polity had become more settled, efforts were made to limit the extra ordinary power of the council. But on the other hand, notwithstanding this apparent popular jealousy and disfavor, Parliament had at other times restored to it some of its ancient power by referring to its cognizance many enormities which were inquirable at common law, and which as such were not under the more modern theory to be ex amined by the council. Yet compared with its original almost unlimited powers the judicature of the king in council had been much restricted by the letter of positive statutes, and from being in
