(105 U.S. 249) was where, by reason of a collision of rail way trains, a passenger was injured, and becoming thereby disordered in mind and body, he some eight months there after committed suicide. The Court held, in a suit by his personal representative against the railroad company, that as his own act was the proximate cause of his death there could be no recovery. In the opinion the Court said: ' The suicide of Schaffer was not the result naturally and reasonably to be expected from the injury received on the train. * » * His insanity, as a cause of his final de struction, was as little the natural or probable result of the negligence of the railway officials as his suicide, and each of these are casual or unexpected causes intervening be tween the act which injured him and his death.'"
Overhanging Branches
The "London Law Journal" gives the following on a rather novel point : "The case of Lemmon v. Webb, decided by the Court of Appeal on Tuesday, clears away the doubts which have so long perplexed the minds of lawyers as to whether ' no tice and previous request ' was a condition precedent to the right of cutting overhanging branches. The Court of Appeal says that it is not — to some extent on the authority of Mr. Justice Best in The Earl of Lonsdale v. Nelson, 2 B. & Cr. 202. In that case Mr. Justice Best excepted the cutting of overhanging boughs to the rule that notice is necessary before the abatement of nuisances of omission on the ground that for an owner to permit boughs to overhang the property of another is an 'act of unequivocal negli gence.' This reason is as absurd as the exception founded upon it is harsh and unfair. A man may well enough as sume, in the absence of any protest or evidence to the con trary, that an ancient tree whose branches overhang his neighbor's property is as great a source of joy and pride to the latter as it is to himself, and in any event, if cutting has to be done, the tree owner ought surely to have the option of doing it. The decision in Lemmon v. Webb not only would, under obvious circumstances, expose to mutilation the famous oak, Wherein the younger Charles abode Till all the paths were dim,
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Nuisance — Vindication of Public against. — It is really too bad of the courts to discourage a rail way corporation when it essays to do a decent thing for the benefit of the public. Therefore we regret, although it probably is good law, that the Supreme Court of Illinois, in Pittsburgh, etc. R'y. Co. v. Cheevers, 37 N. E. Reporter, 49, felt constrained to decide that a railroad company is not entitled to an injunction restraining expressmen and hotel runners from congregating in the street in front of its pas senger station, and there soliciting business in such a manner as to constitute a public nuisance, where the only detriment thereby caused to the company is through the annoyance suffered by its passengers. The Court observed : "It is argued that from such annoyance the business of the company is injuriously affected, in that passengers will avoid patronizing a depot or railroad, in order to patronize which they have to expose themselves to such annoyance. I conemde, as a matter of law. that -such annoyance and indirect injury does not constitute such a nuisance as a court of equity will enjoin, but that, in order to lay the ba sis for equitable relief, it is necessary to show that the com plainant is injured in its property rights by the obstruction or interference with its easement and right to an uninter rupted use of the public street in front of its premises; and such detriment and annoyance as it suffers in common with the public, and which is only indirect, must be left to the public authorities to regulate and control, and cannot be remedied by a court of equity on the application of one, as a member of the public, even though he may suffer more than the majority of others from the existence. It is needless to discuss the numerous authorities cited by the learned coun sel for appellants, which it is claimed establish a rule for this case contrary to that stated by the master. Each one will be found to depend for its decision upon special and peculiar circumstances and conditions, which do not exist in this case. Such occupation or obstruction of a public street as will entitle an owner of land abutting thereon to the aid of a court of equity to abate must be shown to be such as works an injury to him, not merely greater in de gree than that sustained by others of the general public, but such as is special and peculiar in its effects upon him in relation to the use and enjoyment of his property."
but would place the pruning-knife in the unsympathetic hands of some lineal descendant of the Roundhead who 'rode beneath, humming a surly hymn.'" (Brother, your metre is bad, and your quotation is inexact. Read : "And far below the Roundhead rode And hummed a surly hymn." It requires an "American" to quote an English poet from memory.) It would require some ingenu ity to reconcile this doctrine, practically, with that of Hoffman v. Armstrong, 48 New York, 201; 8 Am. Rep. 537, which is that the fruit of overhanging branches belongs to the owner of the tree trunk.
Bastard — Action for Death of. — Modern courts have shown a very healthful tendency to recognize the rights of the mother of a bastard to the exclusion of the father. The latest instance of this is in Marshall v. Wabash R. Co., Missouri Supreme Court, 25 S.W. Reporter, 179, where it was held, under a statute giving a right of action for damages for the wrongful killing of a person, when deceased was a minor and unmarried, to his father and mother, who may join in the suit and have an equal interest in the judgment, that the mother of a bas tard unmarried minor may sue for the wrongful kill
