all controlling. It is only reasonable to expect change in the application of rules of law to the changing affairs of men. The fundamental principles do not alter. The desire and determination to do justice do not change, but the decision as to what is justice in a given case must vary as the circumstances which surround and illustrate the case become more apparent. In conclu sion let it be made clear that if we admit that human intelligence or reason is the main source of our law, we do not on that account discard or underestimate the value of decided cases. In all branches of law these cases are of vital importance,* for they represent the law as it has been ap plied in actual life. They also are the law within the authority of the tribunal deciding them, and with the statutes they constitute the authoritative statements of our law. Moreover reason teaches us to illustrate rules of law in all possible ways, to con
sider all sources of information that are open to us, to take advantage of all ex perience, and to aim to establish broad and just principles. All the constitutions, statutes and laws of the past then, and all the decisions of able courts are aids and guides, for the human reason of the present day to adopt and uphold true rules of justice. But they are simply aids and guides and they should never usurp the authority of reason, which is the final ar biter of the justice of all written and un written law. That this should be recognized is of the utmost consequence to the members of the profession of each new generation. For if it is, they will not be hemmed in by the records of past effort to declare the law, but it will be open to them to discover new principles, new light and new methods that shall make the law more just and more reasonable in its application to the great variety of human affairs.
