Counsel and Client.
475
COUNSEL AND CLIENT. IN a state of barbarism every man's hand is against his neighbor, and personal advantage sets the only limit to his privi leges and his duties. With the first gleam of civilization these privileges are circum scribed by his duty toward others, from which no individual is entirely free. In such a society what, then, may a lawyer do in behalf of his client without infringing his duty to the public, and without regard to the inherent justice of his cause? This is a question oft mooted, both by the profession and the laity, and the extremes are wide apart. Memorable on the one hand are Lord Brougham's hot words uttered in the defence of Queen Caroline, the unhappy wife of George IV. : " An advocate in the discharge of his duty knows but one person, and that person is his client. To save his client by all means and expedients and at all hazards and costs to other persons — and among them himself — is his first and only duty; and in performing that duty he must not regard the alarms, the torments, the destruction he may bring upon others. Sep arating the duty of the patriot from that of advocate, he must go on, reckless of conse quences, though it should be his unhappy lot to involve his country in confusion." These words show zeal, but not discretion; they are commanding, but not convincing. All society is founded on the theory, at least, of the greatest good to the greatest number, and such a code as this is utterly subversive of this fundamental principle. In criminal trials, especially, too often the prosecution seeks to secure a conviction by any means, and the defence, we may assume, usually stops at nothing to escape the penalty of wrong-doing. If the public be aroused to participation and clamor in favor of one or the other, the advocate may find himself unduly swerved, and may seek to gratify such public sentiment to the de
triment of public justice. Cases involving the freedom of the life of the accused demand in the lawyer a far-seeing discrimination and an all-inclusive view. He may be required I to face the indignation of a frowning but unI thinking community, and to maintain his integrity at the sacrifice of popularity or j ambitions. On the other hand, his recreance to duty may entail the most unfortunate re sults. A crime is committed which justly outrages public sentiment, and through sharp practice or corrupt methods the perpetrator goes unpunished; his freedom from restraint, even his existence, involves the peace-loving portion of the community in constant ap prehension; then indignation bursts all bounds; the law's delays and loopholes are made the exuse for defiance of all law, and property and life pay the penalty of one man's overzeal in behalf of a worthless client. Opposite to Lord Brougham's position is that of Sir Matthew Hale, who in his early practice would never accept a seemingly un just cause. But in after life he was con vinced that in this he had in a measure erred, for he felt that no one can so thoroughly know a case as to be entitled to a final opinion on its merits until all the facts are thoroughly presented. In every life ques tions of moral duty arise for daily settlement; paths constantly diverge, and the safe one must hourly and anew be chosen. There is no universal standard; each conscience must settle some things for itself unaided but by an enlightened understanding. One thing positively, however, a lawyer may never do for his client — what the common conscience of mankind would forbid that client to do for himself. He may not espouse the cause of one who seeks to perpetrate a wrong through some chance advantage the law may happen to afford him. But not often, if ever, need a lawyer decline to undertake the
