be immediately before and after the experience. In the case of post-hypnotic hallucinations or enjoined actions we are often able experimentally to determine the momentary recurrence of a state of dream consciousness.[1] A painstaking critic of our evidence, Herr Edmund Parish, affirms the absolute identity of the two classes of impressions: "there is absolutely no distinction, either theoretical or practical, to be drawn between the sense deceptions of the dream state and those of waking consciousness." But the statement is made for controversial purposes, and requires considerable modification. We need not now concern ourselves about theoretic distinctions between the two classes of phenomena. But for practical purposes, especially for the purpose of the present enquiry, there are two very important distinctions between waking hallucinations and the hallucinations of sleep which we call dreams. In the first place, the waking vision is of much rarer occurrence, and much more impressive, as the common experience of mankind, apart from the census, is sufficient to show. In the second place, the waking experience is likely to be more accurately remembered, not only, or even mainly, because of its rarity and impressiveness, but because it has a fixed place in time and generally in space also. Whatever the actual state of the percipient's consciousness at the moment, the vision
- ↑ In some of these experimental eases the subject is found completely to forget his own vision or action immediately afterwards. It would seem therefore that the state of dissociation in the case of spontaneous hallucinations is not as a rule very far-reaching.
