honor of her designer) led Congress in 1816 to authorize the construction of another steam battery. But the conservative officers at the head of affairs in the navy could not understand the importance of steam-propelled ships, and it was not until 1835 that measures were taken to carry out the provisions of the law. In the meantime a number of ships of the line were built, about a dozen in all, and some of them took part later in the Mexican Yar. In 1835 the Secretary of the Navy, acting upon better advice, directed the Board of Commissioners to proceed at once to the construction of a steam man-of-war. In 1837 the vessel was completed and tried, a speed of 12 knots being realized. Her propelling power consisted of side paddle-wheels and engines on the upper deck. Several other paddle-wheel vessels were built in the next few years, one of which was the iron steamer Michigan, which is still in service on the Great Lakes—the first iron vessel in the navy, and also the first one afloat on the Lakes. In 1842-43 the screw steamer Princeton (of about 1000 tons) was built and fitted with machinery designed by John Ericsson. She was the first war vessel in any navy to be fitted with screw propulsion, and likewise the first to have all her machinery and boilers below the water-line and to have blowing fans for forcing the draught under the boilers. A Congressional committee, after considering the advantages of the submerged propeller and iron hulls, recommended in 1846 that thirteen screw steamers of iron be immediately constructed. When authority for the construction of four war steamers was granted in the following year, a board of prominent naval officers recommended that three of the four should have paddle-wheels. The fourth was the San Jacinto; and it as well as the others was built of wood. In 1854 Congress ordered the building of “six first-class steam frigates to be provided with screw propellers.” These vessels were the celebrated ships of the Merrimac, Niagara, and Wabash class. They were of fine model for their day, and should have had good speed, but instead of having full steam and auxiliary sail power they had full sail power and only auxiliary engines. They were followed, however, in 1857 by the steam frigates of the Hartford class, in which the engine power was relatively considerably increased.
The operations of the navy in the Civil War soon showed the true importance of steam and the uselessness, or worse than uselessness, of sails. Even after the close of the war the practice of giving full sail power to our cruising men-of-war was continued from mistaken ideas of economy; though during the war the rigged ships had been very generally stripped of yards and upper masts. The practice died hard, and it was not until 1887 that a full sail rig was abandoned for cruising vessels. The ill-fated Maine was the last ship for general service to be designed to carry a heavy square rig, but this was changed to military masts before her completion.
The importance of possessing armored vessels was realized as soon as the Civil War commenced, and on both sides an investigation of the subject of armored ships was begun at once. The Confederates started work first, but the superior resources of the North enabled the first really armored ships to be completed on practically the same day. Both Monitor and Merrimac (Virginia) were fatally defective in details, but many of the defects were corrected in later vessels of the same types. See Ship, Armored.
After the close of the Civil War the navy again sank into decadence, the enormous expenses entailed by the war causing Congress to cut down appropriations in every direction. The personnel of the regular service was increased just after the end of the struggle, but it was cut down later, the last cut being in 1882, just as new construction was about to commence. During the interval 1866-82 only a few vessels were authorized—five monitors of 4000 to 6000 tons and about a dozen wooden cruisers, only one of which (the Trenton) was over 2000 tons. Old vessels were repaired and kept going, but nothing new was attempted, the wooden cruisers mentioned being out of date when put in service. So that, in 1880, the United States Navy, with its antiquated ships and no less antiquated ordnance, was the laughing-stock of the world and in power below that of several of the small republics of South America. Finally, in 1881, a board was appointed by the Secretary of the Navy to consider the needs of the service. This board recommended the building of sixty-eight vessels of various types.
Congress appropriated for two and at its next session increased the number to four, but reduced the size. The first of these acts was passed August 5, 1882, and in addition to the provision for the two ships made a sweeping cut in the number of officers which blocked promotion for ten years and subsequently caused endless trouble through the deficiencies in the numbers produced by it. Five monitors were started early in the ‘seventies,’ but work on them had long since ceased when it was revived by the act of 1882 which appropriated $400,000 toward their completion. In the next session $1,000,000 additional was appropriated, but the succeeding Congress withdrew all unexpended balances of this. From this time on each Congress made some addition to the navy. In 1886 the Maine and Texas were provided for and in 1890 three battleships of the Oregon type. In deference to the very general prejudice which existed against the high-sided, broadside battleships of European navies, these ships were given rather low free-board and were called ‘coast-line battleships.’ But the Iowa, which was next built, was frankly described as a seagoing battleship, the unreasoning prejudice in favor of the nearly useless low free-board monitor having been much modified.
The war with Spain caused increased attention to be given to naval affairs, not only because the navy had done well, but because the people were beginning to appreciate the importance of a powerful navy to a country which must be attacked from the sea and reach its enemies through its naval strength. They learned not only this, but that true naval defense lies not in passive protection of harbors by forts and harbor-defense ships, but in pursuing the enemy's naval forces at sea and destroying them. The realization of these things caused the navy to be considerably expanded; more heavy battleships, armored cruisers, and torpedo boats were authorized; and the enlisted force, which had been nearly doubled since 1882, was now greatly increased. In
