Page:The Reshaping of British Railways (Beeching Report).pdf/50

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implemented as far as possible without any major capital expenditures, and decisions about new depots will be deferred until the effects of: concentration upon existing depots, modified charging scales, new documentation, and other changes under the plan have been tested.

Another reason for deferring decisions on the provision of new depots is that the ultimate handling and profitability of this traffic is seen to be related to the future of 'Liner Trains', which, if introduced as a network, will cheapen the rail handling of a large part of the sundries traffic flows and provide through-train movement in place of the present wagon forwarding for much of it. Also, the use of containers, and sub-containers or pallets, will facilitate more efficient handling in the sundries sheds than is possible with existing rail wagons.

Further, since Liner Trains will offer speed and regularity comparable with passenger trains, they will open the way for a combination of the sundries and passenger parcels services, with a corresponding improvement in loadings and in overhead expenses.

Sundries traffic, together with parcels, accounts for the employment of about three-quarters of the road vehicle fleet, which cost £21·88 m. in 1960 and £22·15 m. in 1961. Costs will go on rising unless drastic steps are taken, because of increases in wages and materials and, also, because of the growing size and congestion of urban areas. With this in mind, a General Manager of railway cartage services has been appointed to exercise central control so far as is necessary to achieve efficient and co-ordinated use of the road fleet.

Reduction of the Freight Wagon Fleet

The way in which the freight wagon fleet of the railways has varied over the post-war period is shown in Table 2, Appendix 3. The table below shows capacity, together with the volume of freight carried, and the average 'turn-round time'. The fleet was sharply reduced in 1962, but the railways still had 848,591 wagons at the end of the year as will be seen from the figures which follow:—

Year

Number of wagons at 1st January

Tonnage capacity

Number of wagons forwarded loaded (000's)

Tonnage forwarded (000's)

Average turn-round time (days)



1946 1,252,000 39,765 262,400 9.45 1947 1,230,000 37,549 257,300 9.83 1948 1,209,380 36,431 276,117 9.96 1949 1,165,166 14,560,402 36,220 280.170 9.65 1950 1,098,614 14,004,049 35,750 281,348 9.22 1951 1,089,975 14,134,260 35,496 284,803 9.21 1952 1,094,144 14,401,226 34,978 284,916 9.38 1953 1,105,130 14,743,949 34,760 289,271 9.54 1954 1,107,110 14,957,544 34,246 283,498 9.70 1955 1,109,690 15,264,316 31,990 274,177 10.41 1956 1,109,935 15,555,896 31,59% 276,957 10.54 1957 1,102,607 15,731,251 30,822 274,283 10.73 1958 1,090,114 15,846,352 27,063 242,873 12.08 1959 1,005,526 14.981,743 25,750 233,963 11.71 1960 945,260 14,264,830 26,356 248,500 10.76 1961 946,998 14,339,097 24,851 238,177 11-43 1962 941,543 14,347,572 22,580 227,675 12.51 1963

848,591 13,198,121

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