a plan, but one like Trochu's, so profound and so secret, that not the smallest trace of it is ever perceived. The journalists who write thus prove only one thing—that they are ignorant of the very rudiments of the question. The insurrection from the commencement was formidable and irresistible, because from the first it was supported by an armed force, ready organized, namely, the National Guard of Paris; whilst the Government, on its side, had at its command but few troops, and these were of a class which events have proved could not be relied on with entire confidence. For that reason, it became necessary to withdraw to Versailles, weed out the disposable forces, assemble those which the country could spare, await the return of the prisoners from Germany, amalgamate all those elements in new cadres, provide for the equipment and armament of the men, and gradually re-establish discipline and confidence. All this had to be done, and was done, with a rapidity for which it would be unjust not to give the Government credit. The siege of Paris, since the city had to be taken by force, could not be effected with thirty thousand men, nor even with fifty thousand. It is only now, after five weeks of incessant organization, that the army has attained the strength considered necessary, and it is only now that the Government is in a position to strike a decisive blow."
The morning of the 27th opened with a most violent
attack on the forts south of Paris, and continued all day
without interruption. The cannonade was most terrific
from Moulin-de-Pierre, Chatillon, and Meudon; and the
bombardment of Montrouge and Issy was commenced
with a violence of which the first siege gave but a faint
idea. Issy, although dismantled, and, in spite of its
escarpes tumbling into the ditch, and its ruined barracks,
still fought with desperation, throwing shells on the
