mistake made by Prussia in 1806; to think too much of the victories of the great Republic and the first Empire; to forget too much the powerful enemy we had to combat; to contemplate the Crimea of 1854 and the Italy of 1859, instead of looking firmly at the strength of Germany in 1870, and the remarkable men whom she had at her head.
"I do not wish to deny, nor can I, those faults which the Napoleons pay still more dearly for by their heart-felt grief than by their exile; but the Emperor did not seek to cling to the throne by a peace which might save his power in imposing heavy sacrifices on France.
"At all events, we have one consolation, that of having fallen with the country, whereas your elevation dates from her misfortunes.
"Better than any one, you know the conditions which Napoleon III could have obtained from Prussia at Sedan; certainly they were hard, but incomparably less so than those accepted by you. Our sacrifices were not to be compared to those which you signed, without reckoning that we should have avoided the months of disorder entailed by the government of the non-defence of Paris, and by the dictatorship of those of your colleagues who emigrated in balloons to pillage and oppress our provinces. Down to the fall of the Empire, we had suffered great misfortunes, but capable of being repaired, as may be found in the history of many great nations. Since the 4th September, on the contrary, those which have occurred can no longer be so termed—they are disasters unexampled in history.
"To the Empire falls the responsibility of faults, to you that of positive disasters; and I ask, if, amongst the former, the greatest is not to have tolerated your criminal attempts in the interior.
"The inevitable consequence of your usurpation was
