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CHAPTER IV.
Other Considerations concerning Innate Principles,
both Speculative and Practical.
Principles not innate, unless their ideas be innate.§ 1. Had those who would persuade us that there are innate principles not taken them together in gross, but considered separately the parts out of which those propositions are made, they would not, perhaps, have been so forward to believe they were innate: since, if the ideas which made up those truths were not, it was impossible that the propositions made up of them should be innate, or the knowledge of them be born with us. For if the ideas be not innate, there was a time when the mind was without those principles; and then they will not be innate, but be derived from some other original. For where the ideas themselves are not, there can be no knowledge, no assent, no mental or verbal propositions about them.
Ideas, especially those belonging to principles, not born with children.§ 2. If we will attentively consider new-born children, we shall have little reason to think that they bring many ideas into the world with them. For bating perhaps some faint ideas of hunger and thirst, and warmth, and some pains which they may have felt in the womb, there is not the least appearance of any settled ideas at all in them; especially of ideas, answering the terms which make up those universal propositions, that are esteemed innate principles. One may perceive how, by degrees, afterwards, ideas come into their minds; and that they get no more, nor no other, than what experience, and the observation of things that come in their way, furnish them with: which might be enough to satisfy us that they are not original characters, stamped on the mind.
§ 3. "It is impossible for the same thing to be, and
