Page:The Works of William Harvey (part 1 of 2).djvu/255

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INTRODUCTION.
155

equivocation in universals: whence it is advisable from singulars to pass to universals."

All this agrees with what we have previously said, although at first blush it may seem contradictory; inasmuch as universals are first imbibed from particulars by the senses, and in so far are only known to us as an universal is a certain whole and indistinct thing, and a whole is known to us according to sense. For though in all knowledge we begin from sense, because, as the philosopher quoted has it, sensible particulars are better known to sense, still the sensation itself is an universal thing. For, if you observe rightly, although in the external sense the object perceived is singular, as, for example, the colour which we call yellow in the eye, still when this impression comes to be made an abstraction, and to be judged of and understood by the internal sensorium, it is an universal. Whence it happens that several persons abstract several species, and conceive different notions, from viewing the same object at the same time. This is conspicuous among poets and painters, who, although they contemplate one and the same object in the same place at the same moment, and with all other circumstances agreeing, nevertheless regard and describe it variously, and as each has conceived or formed an idea of it in his imagination. In the same way, the painter having a certain portrait to delineate, if he draw the outline a thousand times, he will still give a different face, and each not only differing from the other, but from the original countenance; with such slight variety, however, that looking at them singly, you shall conceive you have still the same portrait set before you, although, when set side by side, you perceive how different they are. Now the reason is this: that in vision, or the act of seeing itself, each particular is clear and distinct; but the moment the object is removed, as it is by merely shutting the eyes, when it becomes an abstraction in the fancy,.or is only retained in the memory, it appears obscure and indistinct; neither is it any longer appre-