more excellent, more exquisite than they. Now it seems a thing common to all animals, that they have a congenital power of judging, which we call sense. Since sense is innate, then, the things perceived by sense remain in some animals; in others they do not remain. Those in whom they do not remain, however, have either no knowledge at all, or at least none beyond the simple perception of the things which do not remain; others, again, when they perceive, retain a certain something in their soul. Now, as there are many animals of this description, there is already a distinction between one animal and another; and to this extent, that in some there is reason from the memory of things; and in others there is none. Memory, therefore, as is said, follows from sense; but from repeated recollection of the same thing springs experience (for repeated acts of memory constitute a single experience). From experience, however, or from the whole and universal stored quietly in the mind, (one, to wit, in place of a multitude—because in the whole crowd of particulars there is one and the same universal,) is derived the principle of art and of science: of art, if it belong to production (i. e. action); of science, if it belong to that which is (i. e. the knowledge of entity). Consequently there are neither any definite habits that are innate, nor any habits that are formed from other and more known habits, but from sense."
From which words of Aristotle it plainly appears by what order or method any art or science is acquired, viz. The thing perceived by sense remains; from the permanence of the thing perceived results memory; from multiplied memory, experience; from experience, universal reason, definitions, and maxims or common axioms, the most certain principles of knowledge; for example, the same thing under like conditions cannot be and not be; every affirmation or negation is either true or false; and so on.
Wherefore, as we have said above, there is no perfect know-
