produced in such order, or as coexistent, that from these, as the elements of animal bodies, conjoined organs or limbs, and finally, the entire animal, should be compounded. But, as has been already said, the first rudiment of the body is a mere homogeneous and pulpy jelly, not unlike a concrete mass of spermatic fluid; and from this, under the law of generation, altered, and at the same time split or multifariously divided, as by a divine fiat, from an inorganic an organic mass results ; this is made bone, this muscle or nerve, this a receptacle for excrementitious matter, &c. ; from a similar a dissimilar is pro- duced ; out of one thing of the same nature several of diverse and contrary natures ; and all this by no transposition or local movement, as a congregation of similar particles, or a separa- tion of heterogeneous particles is effected under the influence of heat, but rather by the segregation of homogeneous than the union of heterogeneous particles.
And I believe that the same thing takes place in all genera- tion, so that similar bodies have no mixed elements prior to themselves, but rather exist before their elements (these, ac- cording to Empedocles and Aristotle, being fire, air, earth, and water ; according to chemists, salt, sulphur, and mercury ; according to Democritus, certain atoms), as being naturally more perfect than these. There are, I say, both mixed and compound bodies prior to any of the so called elements, into which they are resolved, or in which they end. They are resolved, namely, into these elements according to reason rather than in fact. The so-called elements, therefore, are not prior to those things that are engendered, or that originate, but are posterior rather they are relics or remainders rather than principles. Neither Aristotle himself nor any one else has ever de- monstrated the separate existence of the elements in the nature of things, or that they were the principles of " similar" bodies.
The philosopher, 1 indeed, when he proceeds to prove that there are elements, still seems uncertain whether the conclu- sion ought to be that they exist in esse, or only in posse; he is of opinion that in natural things they are present in power rather than in action; and therefore does he assert, from the division, separation, and solution of things, that there
1 Lib. iii, tic Ccelo, cap. 31.
�� �
